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This thesis considers how informational imperfections may give rise to advantages for
those born to relatively rich parents. The first chapter focuses on the separation of some
societies into different classes. Within the model, classes provide greater advantages to
those from privileged backgrounds and, even in the absence of legal barriers preventing
the lower classes from accessing skilled jobs, the skilled amongst them are still de facto
denied access to high paying jobs through statistical discrimination. This chapter shows
that there can be a net benefit from class discrimination, versus a classless state, when
it creates information relating to the abilities of the upper class.
This theme is expanded on in chapter two where a signalling model more explicitly
describes the statistical discrimination suffered by some members of society. The ad-
vantage conferred on those from privileged backgrounds generates income dispersion,
which in turn reinforces the advantages of the rich. If this feedback is strong enough,
the model may exhibit multiplicity of steady states. This multiplicity of steady states
is backward looking: the income dispersion today depends on the extent to which firms
use the information available to them, which in turn depends on the income dispersion
in the previous generation. The model of chapter two also demonstrates why societies
with more “meritocratic” institutions may exhibit less intergenerational income mobil-
ity: the income dispersion that meritocracy creates increases the value of a privileged
upbringing.
The final chapter adds parental investment to the model. In doing so it brings the
model more squarely in line with the statistical discrimination literature, although the
ii
model does not exhibit a multiplicity of equilibria. There is a unique optimal investment
rule for parents. Exogenous shocks to meritocracy are again examined. Meritocracy
increases income variance and hence, from behind the veil of ignorance, creates greater
uncertainty over the income an individual will receive. The model describes how a risk
averse person might prefer to be born into an economy where they expect to be poorer
but avoid this increased uncertainty, and so despite raising incomes, meritocracy may
make agents, on average, more unhappy.
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Class divisions have been a long-standing talking point in the UK and our continuing
research into social mobility, or the lack thereof, tells of the uneasiness with which
we greet this situation. A recent report on social mobility chaired by Alan Milburn
MP found that the UK was far from a classless society and that if anything family
background has become more important for access to the professions. In the US, a
trend towards greater income segregation, in addition to persistent racial inequality, led
one liberal American publication to write, “a growing percentage of white workers are
now experiencing the same kinds of economic challenges that most African Americans
have been facing since the 1970s” (Rodgers (2008)). This suggests that the traditional
racial divisions, rather than being eradicated, may be being transformed into a British
style class system.
This first chapter of my thesis examines under which circumstances such systems
can be sustained. Their emergence is modelled as a consequence of statistical discrim-
ination. In the absence of classes, firms lack the information they require to determine
the talent of an individual. They have little to base their pay decisions on and do not
know which workers to assign to a relatively complex task. The class signal provides
them, perhaps imperfectly, with that information. The cost is that the talented group
of people created is smaller than the proportion of workers they would like to assign to
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the complex task. Within the model, where the informational gains exist, they dom-
inate the allocation costs. However, there are many steady state divisions of society
which go beyond the point at which these gains are exhausted.
As we will see below, there are class divisions of society which can be sustained
in steady state for which both classes of society are better off than if no such class
division existed. This should not mask the fact, however, that the lower classes are
being discriminated against. A talented lower class worker will still be paid less than
an untalented upper class one, despite talent being the only difference in productivity
between workers. The circumstances of birth deny access to a high paying job for a
worker who is perfectly capable of carrying it out, yet at the same time he is paid more
than if a class system did not exist. The reason is the firms’ lack of information which
will be a common feature of much of this thesis.
1.1 Literature Review
The origins of this chapter, and this thesis in general, lie primarily in the discrimination
literature. As such, it will be useful to discuss it as background before moving on to
the model.
Papers on discrimination generally have their origins in one of two sources: preference-
based discrimination (Becker (1957)); and statistical discrimination (Phelps (1972);
Arrow (1973)). Becker-style discrimination involves utility maximising agents who suf-
fer a utility cost from employing, working with, or being served by individuals from
particular groups. It is, in essence, a model of racism and sexism. The origins of this
chapter’s model are instead in statistical discrimination. In this line of literature indi-
viduals give a signal of their ability but that signal is imperfect. Employers combine a
worker’s signal with the other information that they have about them, say their race.
In some equilibria, beliefs about both groups are the same and so race contains no use-
ful information on which to discriminate. However, there may also be equilibria where
the two groups are treated differently. One group is believed to be less talented and
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so their investments in education open fewer doors for them. As a result they invest
less in education and so are, in fact, less talented. It is a story which has been used in
other areas of economics (for its application to fiscal policy and inequality see Piketty
(1995, 1998)).
The Phelps article cited above was based on the difference in variance of the signals
of the two groups, an assumption which was carried through into Lundberg & Startz
(1983) and Lazear (1995). This chapter is more in keeping with the Arrow tradition
which can be followed through to the seminal contribution of Coate and Loury on
statistical discrimination and affirmative action (Coate & Loury (1993)). That article
provided a model which outlined the statistical discrimination mechanism, but there
were two important omissions. One was that the productive sector was not specified.
The other was that the wage for the more complex task was constant and exogenously
given. This meant that the two groups (in their case black and white) were entirely
separate, the wage of one unaffected by what was happening to the other.
Moro and Norman, in a number of papers, (Moro (2003); Moro & Norman (2004);
Norman (2003)) addressed these issues and extended the Coate and Loury model to
include a production function with complementarity between the two tasks, simple and
complex, and endogenous determination of both wages. The complex task could only
be done by talented individuals and, as such, the wage for performing the complex task
was a function of the individual’s probability of being talented. This chapter builds on
top of those features a dynamic framework where workers are discriminated based on
an endogenous class signal. The focus on an endogenous, intrinsically useful signal is
distinct from the discrimination of (for the most part ex ante identical) individuals on
the basis of race, ethnicity, or gender discussed in much of the literature. The model of
section 1.2 will lay the foundations for considering the class divisions which may exist
in steady state.
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1.2 A model of class divisions
Assume that there is a population of mass one and that each individual has one child.
Every individual may be talented or not. If they are talented they have a value of τ
equal to one. If they are not, they have a value of τ equal to zero. There are up to
two “classes” of individual depending on parental income: if an individual’s parent is
rich he is from the “upper” class; if his parent is poor he is from the “lower” class. In
what follows, we assume that class is observable but talent is not. In the next chapter
we will consider a case where both are imperfectly observable.
The production function is Cobb-Douglas. There are two tasks in society, and
our inputs to production are the effective labour input into each task. One task is
“complex”. Only talented individuals are able to perform it and any individual trying
to perform the complex task who is not talented will produce nothing. The other task
is “simple”. Everyone is capable of performing the simple task.
y = C̃γS1−γ (1.1)
C̃ is the effective labour input into the complex task. These are the individuals
who are doing the complex task and are capable of doing it. Firms will not be able
to observe whether an individual has the skills to perform the task and so will have to
form an expectation based on the observable about an individual: his class. S is the
labour input into the simple task.
Every individual in society will be offered a wage for performing each task equal
to his or her expected marginal product. Workers have no preference over tasks but
will always choose the task for which they are offered the higher wage. If a worker is
indifferent, a firm can allocate them to whichever task it prefers.
The effective labour input into the complex task is equal to the number of people
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doing the complex task multiplied by the proportion of them which actually have the
skills to carry it out: C̃ = Prob (τ = 1)K, where K is the proportion of the population












Prob (τ = 1)
The wage which a firm will offer to an individual choosing the complex task, wc, is
equal to the wage that they would offer a talented person performing the complex task
multiplied by the probability that that person is talented. This is because talent is a
necessary prerequisite for being able to carry out the complex task.
We will assume that the probability that an individual is talented is an increasing
function of their parent’s income, w−1. Individuals from a richer background are likely
to have had greater investments made in their schooling and childhood development,
putting them in a better position to take on skilled tasks when they enter the labour
force. This underlying investment process will be considered in detail in chapter 3 but,
for now, we will assume it to be true. This probability reaches a maximum of one for
those with sufficiently rich parents.
Prob (τ = 1) =
 P (w−1) if w−1 < P
−1 (1)
1 if w−1 ≥ P−1 (1)
where P (·) is an increasing function of w−1. We will assume below that P (w−1) =
awb−1.
1We will see below that all individuals performing the complex task have the same probability of
being able to do so in steady state and so the proportion able to perform the task is equal to the
probability that any one of them can do so. I use Prob (τ = 1) to represent the probability of being
talented of someone performing the complex task. These are the only people whose talent plays a role
in output.
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This is the same for all workers since there is no minimum skill level required to be
able to perform the simple task.
Since class is observable, and talent is not, the wage that a worker in the complex
sector is offered will be dependent on her class. All individuals will receive one of two
wage offers for performing the complex task. If their parent is rich, and hence they are






τ = 1|w−1 = wc−1
)
(1.3)







τ = 1|w−1 = ws−1
)
(1.4)
Note that in equations 1.3 and 1.4 we are considering only two options for parent’s
income in a class divided society, wc−1 and w
s
−1. This is because in steady state noone
will receive the income wc|s. Imagine they did. This would imply that wc|s > ws: the
lower class children would choose to undertake the complex task. But, if the lower
class would choose the complex task so would the upper class, since firms will believe
them to be at least as likely to be able to perform it. Class division then, in a world
where workers are free to choose their task, requires that the lower class is sufficiently
disadvantaged as to remain lower class which precludes the acceptance of wc|s in steady
state.
6
1.3 The steady state without classes
A steady state of this model is a situation in which the distribution of income is constant
across time. The easiest steady states to calculate are those in which all agents are paid
the same wage for either task since, instead of an unchanged distribution across time,
this amounts to a unique constant wage (although we allow the steady state economy
to exhibit a class divide, it does not have to). When this is the case all individuals have
the same probability of being talented.
We will begin with a situation in which all individuals within a generation receive





Prob (τ = 1|w−1 = w−1) =
∂y
∂S
Everyone within a given generation is indifferent between the two tasks since they
earn a common wage for both. The effective labour input into each task will be C̃ =
P (w−1)K and S = 1 − K, the latter of these coming from the fact that all workers
who are not assigned to the complex task are able to perform the simple one.2
We will use P (w−1) = aw
b
−1 to describe the relationship between parental income
and talent where parental income if sufficiently low that the probability of being talented
















2Workers are all assigned to tasks by firms since they will be paid the same in either and so will
be indifferent as to which task they perform.
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Figure 1.1: Possible steady state wages in the economy with no classes: (a) γb < 1; (b)
γb = 1; and (c) γb > 1.
The first of these conditions sets the wages to be equal across tasks within a gen-
eration. The second describes the relationship between wages across generations. It is
illustrated in figure 1.1 for values of γb less than, greater than and equal to one.3
Since γb = 1 is a special case, and an intermediate case of the others, it will not be
considered in the discussion below. It should be clear from the diagram which steady
states exist in this case. When the function is above or below the w = w−1 line, the
wage is rising or falling across generations respectively. The steady states are shown
at the points where w = w−1, the steady state condition. We will now turn to each in
turn.
1.3.1 Steady states of the economy when γb < 1
These values of the parameters indicate that either complex labour’s share of output
is low or talent is relatively inelastic in parental income. It means that the wage is a
concave function of the parental wage. At relatively low incomes there are large gains
in the income of subsequent generations from raising current incomes, large enough to
be sustained. This concavity allows the steady state wage to reach a positive value
at which it is sufficiently unresponsive to the parental wage to be stable. This section
examines each of the steady state values of the wage drawn in panel (a) of figure 1.1.
3Whether γb is greater than or less than 1 describes the convexity or concavity of this function in
w−1. For γb equal to one it is linear.
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The first possible steady state solution is,
w∗ = 0 (1.5)
This steady state is possible for all values of γ,a and b but, as we can see from the
diagram, is not stable when γb < 1. Any positive income shock will lead to income
growth towards a higher steady state as it leads to sufficient development of talent in
subsequent generations.
The other steady state values of the wage drawn in figure 1.1(a) are really two
cases of the same one. The lower one only exists for values of γ, a and b which satisfy
a < 1
γγb(1−γ)(1−γ)b







In this steady state workers have a positive probability of being talented but the
condition on a ensures that they are not talented with certainty. They earn a positive
wage in either task and it is stable.
The highest steady state wage drawn is one for which the common wage is suf-




w∗ = γγ (1− γ)(1−γ) (1.7)
The two conditions on a are mutually exclusive so, as can be seen in figure 1.1,
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equations 1.6 and 1.7 essentially describe the same steady state for different values of
a. There is one stable steady state level of income. For a given value of γb it may, for
a sufficiently high a, lead to all workers being talented. Otherwise only a fraction of
them will be talented. The parameter a measures the probability that an individual is
talented for a given value of his parent’s income. It can be thought of as the technology
of talent formation and analogous to the efficiency of the public education system.
Here, the steady state wage is increasing in the efficiency of the education system up
to the point where all workers are talented. This is very intuitive.
1.3.2 Steady states of the economy when γb > 1
In this economy the complex task represents a larger share of production or a worker’s
talent is relatively elastic with respect to her parent’s income. The result is that the
wage is a convex function of the parental wage as illustrated in panel (c) of figure 1.1.
Changes in parents’ wages lead to more than proportional changes in children’s wages.
Thus if income is high and increasing, it will tend to keep increasing, but if it is low, it
will tend to be falling. This leads to an “all-or-nothing” society which tends to stabilise
with either everyone, or noone, being talented.
The first possible steady state solution is again w∗ = 0 only in this case it is stable.
An income shock will not affect the steady state wage in the long run. Following the
shock the economy would not be able to support a skilled upper class of workers capable
of carrying out the complex task because, for low levels of income, the talent gains from
positive income shocks are too small. The wage would fall back to zero and so there
exists a poverty trap.
The second and third possible steady states have the same level of income as in
equations 1.6 and 1.7. The difference when γb > 1 is that they either both exist or
both do not. If they do, the one given in equation 1.6 is unstable while the one given
in 1.7, where all workers are talented, is stable.




economy’s output is heavily dependent on the complex sector, or the development of
a skilled workforce requires a high income in the previous generation, then an efficient
public education system is required to prevent the economy collapsing into poverty. If
the education system is of low enough quality, eventually people will not be guaranteed
to be talented and there will be too few talented workers to support the complex sector.
The economy will go into decline.
As an example, this would suggest that, at least in a classless society when private
spending on education is complementary to public spending, economies with relatively
large high tech sectors (high γ) or efficient privately funded university systems (high b)
may still go into decline if they do not maintain a good enough public education system
(low a). Although γ is not endogenous to the model, it also shows that rich countries
in which the public education system is going into decline might be better to shift away
from skilled labour in their production (reduce γ). This would allow them to maintain
a stable steady state level of income below the maximum rather than experiencing a
long decline into poverty.
1.4 The steady state with classes
In this section we will consider how the situation changes when firms observe an indi-
vidual’s class when making wage decisions. They now have something to distinguish
between workers and so will not necessarily offer the same wages to all. The equilibrium
wages paid ws, wc, and wc|s are given in equations 1.2 to 1.4. These wages are based
on the task that the worker is performing and which class they hail from. Depending
on how the wages relate to one another, a proportion K of workers will be choosing
the complex task and (1−K) the simple task.
It must be that wc > wc|s in any class-based society. This simply states that those
from a richer background are offered a higher wage to perform the complex task since
they are more likely to be able to perform that task. As a result K can only take one
of three values: K = 0; K = 1; and K = K−1.
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If ws > wc > wc|s then everyone would want to do the simple task (K = 0).
Similarly, if wc > wc|s > ws then everyone would want to do the complex task (K = 1).
In either case the economy, which is reliant on both tasks for producing output, would
collapse to a classless society with no productive output. Wages would be equal at zero.
These can therefore not be the structure of equilibrium wage offers in a class divided
society.
If wc > ws > wc|s then K = K−1 as the upper class individuals perform the complex
task and the lower class individuals perform the simple task. This is the only K for
which a class division exists in society. Since it is constant through all time we will call
it K0.















τ = 1|w−1 = ws−1
)
(1.8)
All of the wages in the economy will be determined by two things: the distribution
of workers across the two tasks; and the productivity of workers in the complex task.
The former we know is given by K0 in all periods. The latter will be determined by the
proportion of complex workers who are talented, itself a function of the steady state
wage in the complex sector. We will now focus on determining that, again assuming
that P (w−1) = aw
b
−1.




























This describes the relationship of wages across time in the complex sector. Since
4Technically wc ≥ ws > wc|s or wc > ws ≥ wc|s could be enough since presumably the firm would
choose to assign the upper class workers to the complex task in the first case, and the lower class
workers to the simple task in the second, in order to prevent output collapsing to zero.
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Figure 1.2: Possible steady state wages in the economy with class division: (a) γb < 1;
(b) γb = 1; and (c) γb > 1.
the children of complex workers also perform the complex task, it also describes the
upper class wage process. It is illustrated in figure 1.2 for values of γb less than, greater
than and equal to one. Since a steady state requires that the distribution of income
is unchanged over time, and K0 is constant, the equilibrium wages must be constant
across periods. Our steady state condition is therefore wc = wc−1.
1.4.1 Steady states when γb < 1
The first possible steady state is again one where wages are equal to zero. However,
clearly this would not satisfy our condition for a class divided equilibrium given in
equation 1.8. It therefore cannot lead to a steady state distribution of income with
distinct classes. As we can see from the diagram in panel (a) of figure 1.2, there are
then two separate cases for which there is a stable steady state value of the upper class
wage: in one, not all of the upper class workers are talented; in the other, they are.
The two are mutually exclusive. If the upper class wage is stable, so will be the lower
class one.
A steady state where not all complex workers are talented


























In order to ensure that not all of the complex workers are talented, there must be
a large enough number of them. The marginal productivity of complex workers tends
to infinity as their numbers fall to zero, and so eventually they would have to have
sufficiently high income to all be talented.
In addition to having a large enough mass on complex workers to ensure that they
are not all talented, we also need the distribution of workers to be such that equation
1.8 is satisfied. The upper classes have to choose the complex task and the lower classes
the simple one. To ensure this, we need to know the steady state simple wage and the
wage offered to lower class workers to perform the complex task. From equations 1.1,
1.2 and 1.9 we can find the steady state value of the simple wage.








Interestingly, the simple wage can be increasing or decreasing in K0. As K0 in-
creases, the number of simple workers decreases, the number of complex workers in-
creases, and the proportion of talented complex workers decreases. The first two are
standard ways in which the simple wage should increase. The last effect is born out
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of the fall in the complex wage. If it is large enough, it can push the effective labour
input into the complex task down, despite there being more workers performing it. The
scarcity of workers who are able to perform the complex task may in turn lead to a fall
in the marginal productivity of simple workers.
In a similar manner to that of ws∗, we can find the steady state wage offered to a
lower class worker for performing the complex task from equation 1.4.








Again, this may be increasing or decreasing in K0 depending on whether the simple
wage and the effective labour input into the complex task are increasing or decreasing.









, K0 > 0 (1.13)
The two conditions that make this inequality hold are 0 < K0 < γ and b > 1.
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It is not surprising that a high value of b is important for the existence of a class
divided society. The sensitivity of talent to parental income was always likely to play
an important role since it magnifies the advantages of the upper class over the lower.








< K0 < γ (1.14)
5Since b > 1 implies convexity in the relationship between the parental wage and the probability






b . However, it is plausible that we would observe this sort of convexity at low values of
wc−1. An example might be where initial parental investment develops basic skills required in order for
further investments to raise the probability of being able to perform a complex task.
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there exists a steady state distribution of workers in the economy such that a constant
fraction K0 are upper class and performing the complex task in any period. Only upper
class workers perform the complex task and not all of them are qualified to do so. Only
lower class workers perform the simple task. The wages paid to workers are given by
equations 1.9 and 1.11. These wages are stable.
It is worth noting at this point that this steady state will be an important one.
It was mentioned that the steady state simple wage could be higher if the lower class
contained a larger fraction of the population. When b > 1, it will be. This is due to
spillovers from the upper classes when they are richer and better able to carry out the
complex task (it requires that they are not already perfectly able to carry it out). Thus
both classes of worker would be better off in a class based society than a classless one.
This will be the only steady state for which this can happen.
A steady state where all complex workers are talented
In this section we will examine the steady state which may arise when γb < 1 in which








For this to be a steady state wage with class division we again need to satisfy a
condition ensuring all complex workers are talented, and a condition ensuring workers

















In order for there to be a steady state where all complex workers are talented,
there must be few enough of them to keep their wage sufficiently high. Comparing
equations 1.10 and 1.16 we can see that they are mutually exclusive. Only one of these
steady states values of the complex wage can exist at a time. There is no multiplicity
in incomes, at least for stable values of income and situations in which there is a class
division in society. This is also clear from figure 1.2(a).
The condition on the distribution of workers which we need to satisfy in order for
this steady state to be viable is the familiar one from equation 1.8. In this case the











. Here the wage for the simple task is decreasing
as more people carry it out, as we would normally expect. The gains from a higher










< K0 < min
γ , 11 + (a (1− γ)b) 1γb

If γb is less that one, and equation 1.16 is satisfied, it means that reductions in
K0, channelling people into the simple job, bring down earnings in the simple job to
a greater extent than it brings down the earnings the lower class would earn from
performing the complex task. The scarcity of workers performing the complex task
becomes more of a concern to firms than the relatively low probability that the lower
classes can fill in. At low values of K0 the lower classes would find it optimal to switch
to the complex task. Equally, high values of K0 cannot be sustained in this steady state,
either because the upper classes would wish to switch to the simple task or because the
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lower classes would earn a sufficiently high wage that they were all qualified to do the




























To summarise, if γb < 1 and K0 satisfies equation 1.17, there exists a steady state
where there are two classes of worker. A proportion K0 are upper class and performing
the complex task at any time. All upper class workers are qualified to do the complex
task but not all lower class workers are, and the wages paid to the upper and lower
class workers are stable.
Before we move on to consider the case of γb > 1, it may be useful to summarise
what we have found for γb < 1. If either 1.14 or 1.17 hold, there is a range of values
for the size of the upper class and lower classes which can be maintained over time at
a constant level. At this value of K0 there are unique values of the wages paid to the
upper and lower classes. There may be values of K0 at the upper end of this range,
given by equation 1.10, for which not all of the upper class workers are talented. In
that case, a value of b greater than 1 would be required to accentuate the differences
in ability between the two classes. It also opens up the possibility that, were there
a choice of K0, creating a smaller, higher paid, exclusively talented upper class may
improve efficiency, and the incomes of both classes, in the economy. Despite the smaller
number of complex workers, effective input into that sector would be higher since the
proportion of them which are capable of doing the task increases. The more productive
complex sector has spillover effects into the simple sector, raising the wages of lower
class workers. We will illustrate these potential gains from class divisions in section
1.5.
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1.4.2 Steady states when γb > 1
The situation when γb is greater than one is illustrated in figure 1.2(c). As in the
previous section, the steady state with complex wage equal to zero is clearly at odds
with the notion of an upper class and does not satisfy equation 1.8. The other two
steady state levels of the complex wage, as in section 1.3.2, either both exist or both do
not. The condition for their existence is given by equation 1.16. This would open up
the possibility of multiplicity of income distributions, however, the lower valued one,
where upper class workers are not all talented, is an unstable steady state. As a result,
we will not discuss it much further, other than to say that the wages are as in section
1.4.1 where all workers were not talented.
The only stable steady state complex wage which leads to class division is given
by equation 1.15. It is high enough that all upper class individuals are talented. The
lower class wage is also as set out in section 1.4.1 and the condition for existence of a
steady state income distribution is,




























In the case of γb less than one, as K0 became very small the lower classes would
find it optimal to switch to the complex task. Here they do not. They are severely
disadvantaged by their lower class status. When K0 is smaller, their low wage makes
it very unlikely that they are capable of performing the complex task and so, despite
the scarcity of complex workers, they are unwilling to switch. Firms will not offer
them a high enough wage to induce them to do so. Societies where skilled labour is an
important input into production or where skill development is very elastic in parental
income can maintain a very large lower class.
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On the other hand, K0 must be sufficiently small for four things to happen. The
first condition prevents the upper class workers from switching to the simple task. The
second prevents the lower class workers from switching to the complex task. Since an
increase in K0 lowers the wages of the upper class and raises those of the lower class,
either is possible for sufficiently high values of K0. The third condition ensures that all
workers performing the complex task are capable of doing so, while the last condition
ensures that all workers performing the simple task are not. This is essential for class
division.
1.5 A numerical example
To make these ideas clearer, let us consider a numerical example for which γb < 1. Let
γ = 0.5, b = 1.5 and a = 1. From equations 1.14 and 1.17 we can calculate that an
upper class containing between 1.6 per cent and 50 per cent of the population could
be maintained in steady state. If there is less than 20 per cent of the population in
the upper class, they will all be talented. At a point below which 1.6 per cent of the
population are performing the complex task, the incentive to switch is sufficient for the
lower classes that they do so, and there is no longer an upper and lower class within
society. This is illustrated in figure 1.3, panel (a).
One of the interesting features of the figure is that if K0 is below 0.5, output is









Differentiating with respect to K0 and using the knowledge that b > 1 and γb < 1,
we find y∗ is decreasing in K0. Not only that, both the lower and upper classes gain from
a rich upper class minority and inequality. This is because the misallocation of workers
is reduced once firms have a marker, class, on which to base their wage decisions.
Workers self select based on these wages in such a way that the effective labour input
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Figure 1.3: Steady state wages and output for different steady state sizes of the upper
class when γb < 1: (a) γ = 0.5; a = 1; b = 1.5; (b) γ = 0.5; a = 0.7; b = 1.5; (c)
γ = 0.5; a = 1; b = 1.8; (d) γ = 0.5; a = 0.7; b = 1.8
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into the complex task is increasing, even as fewer people are doing it. Their increased
productivity spills over into the simple sector. These gains are exhausted at K0 equal
to 0.2 because at this point all the complex workers are talented. Steady state output
is then given by,
y∗∗ = Kγ0 [1−K0]
1−γ
which is increasing in K0. Thus the optimum steady state in terms of total output is
at K = 0.2 and not K0 = 0.5.
Panel (b) decreases a to 0.7. Thus for a given parental income, the probability
that a child is talented is lower. This could be one effect of a relatively weak education
system. The gains from having fewer complex workers extend to lower values of K0
since, for a given K0 the upper class wage will be lower when a is lower, and for a
given upper class wage the education system struggles to produce exclusively talented
workers. In fact output will, in general, tend to be relatively low in such a society and
the gains from class division are weaker. The level of talent in the classless steady state
is lowered and the peak output level falls from 0.4 to below 0.35.
An effect of weakness in the public education system is likely to be a relatively high
value of b. Private investments are likely to play a greater role in talent development
when public education is performing poorly. An increase in b to 1.8 is illustrated in
panel (c). Its main effect is the increase in convexity of the wage and output curves.
When private investment in children’s development plays a large role, the gains from
having an identifiable class of skilled workers come at relatively low values of K0.
There are large benefits to having a small upper class since it generates a sufficiently
high probability that the upper classes are able to perform their task. 6
Panel (d) of figure 1.3 illustrates both a fall in a and an increase in b relative to panel
(a). It combines the changes which took place in panels (b) and (c). If this roughly
corresponds to a fall in the efficiency of the public education system, both through
lowering the probability of being talented for a given parental income and increasing
6Considering figure 1.2(a), the multiplier effect from a fall in K0 is greater when b is larger. Thus
there is more to gain in this case from squeezing K0 and creating a very small upper class, as it can
raise their steady state wage and probability of being talented greatly.
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Figure 1.4: Steady state wages and output for different steady state sizes of the upper
class when γb > 1: γ = 0.5; a = 1; b = 2.5
the role of private investments, a small, rich upper class will maximise output and
provide a Pareto improvement over the classless steady state. A small number of
workers in the complex sector is required to create a class that is significantly more
talented than the other.
In all four of these illustrations the overall message is the same: by creating an
identifiable class of workers who are more likely to be talented, the economy, and
everyone in it, can do better.
Figure 1.4 shows the situation when γ = 0.5, b = 2.5 and a = 1. In this case γb > 1
and so the only stable steady state complex wage is one where all of the upper class
are talented. In order for this to happen, they must number at most 20 per cent of the
population. Any reduction in their size below this causes a larger imbalance between
the complex and simple sector workforces (each has a 50 per cent share of output) with
no gain in terms of the information available to firms.
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1.6 Extending the model
Section 1.4 found unique steady state distributions of workers and income where a
proportion K0 of individuals were performing the complex task and receiving w
c∗ and
a proportion 1−K0 were carrying out the simple task and receiving ws∗. These could
be thought of as classes, since wc∗ > ws∗ and generations of families received the same
wage.
This section shows how the same principles could be applied to a richer model of the
economy where there are a continuum of tasks to choose from, and hence a continuum
of wages and classes. A subscript i will represent the task, where i is on a scale 0 to
1 with the higher valued i’s representing more demanding tasks (those for which it is









where χ̃i is the effective labour input into task i. Let Pi (w) be the probability that an
individual with parental wage w can perform task i and for a given wage Pa (w) > Pb (w)





This is the equivalent of equation 1.3 in steady state. There must also be a similar






Pj (wi) ∀i, j 6= i
It states that in steady state Ki must be such that the best any individual can do,
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given that he is from class i, is perform task i. This keeps the proportions of people
allocated to each task constant across time and maintains the separation between the
classes. Individuals would be impeded or advantaged by birth in exactly the same way
as in the two sector model described above.
1.7 Conclusion
The chapter lays the foundations upon which I will build in the remainder of the thesis.
It investigated the advantages of birth and the extent to which your background, or
class, may be used as a signal of your abilities. Equally it describes the impediments
which the skilled members of the lower class face. They freely choose the job for which
the steady state wage is lower despite being capable of performing the one for which it
is higher. Their class ensures that, from their point of view, this is the optimal thing
to do.
Convexity has been seen to be important. Without convexity in the probability of
being talented with respect to parental income, it is difficult to sustain a steady state
with class division. Convexity implies that the elasticity must be greater than one.
This perhaps is not surprising. Convexity tends to pull people apart. However, classes
may only be of benefit if this does not occur to too great an extent, and if the deviation
in the size of classes is not too great compared to the classless steady state.
The main result of this chapter can be seen in figure 1.3. For γb less than one,
steady state output is higher in an economy with a class divide than the classless society.
Instead of everyone having the same probability of being talented, society specialises.
The upper class specialise in the complex task and achieve a high probability of talent
and high marginal productivity. The spillover to the lower classes also raises their
marginal productivity.
This idea has been captured in other papers, notably those of Norman and Moro
(Moro (2003); Moro & Norman (2004); Norman (2003)) where allocative efficiency
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could be enhanced by specialisation. They do not derive conditions under which such
specialisation is possible in their model nor is the signal upon which division is possible
endogenous. This chapter is a step in that direction.
We require 1 < b < 1/γ. The probability of being talented must be sufficiently
elastic in parental income that, for lower values of K0, the lower classes will not find it
optimal to switch to the complex task. They need to be discriminated against to a large
enough extent. At the same time, to generate the stable intermediate wages required,
it must be that b is not too large. The only class based economies with b > 1/γ are
ones for which output would be at least as high if the complex sector were larger.
The gains from specialisation extend over a wider range of steady state distributions
of workers if a is smaller. If, given parental income, the probability of being talented
in lower, perhaps through deficiencies in the education system, the economy can gain
from relatively large deviations in the size of the upper class from the classless state.
These gains, however, tend to be more limited since deviations from the allocation of
workers in the classless steady state come at a cost. Similarly, large deviations from the
classless steady state lead to gains in output and wages if b is large. This corresponds to
the increasing importance of private investments, a feature of a weak public education
system.
A final feature which the class divided society of this model captures is that all
groups can gain from specialisation, including the lower classes. As output is increased,
the lower classes capture some of the increase. There is a trickle-down effect. So
although the lower classes are relatively disadvantaged in our class based society, they
may be better off than they would be in the classless alternative. However, raising the
incomes of the upper classes when γb > 1, or when the size of the lower class is large,
will produce no such gains amongst the lower classes. They exist only up to a point.
Equally this should not mask the discrimination that the skilled lower class workers,
and advantages that the unskilled upper class workers, are experiencing. The following
two chapters will consider these issues in more detail.
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Chapter 2
The Inheritance of Advantage1
In chapter 1 we saw how class, or parental income, allowed workers born to particular
families to inherit advantages. There were upper class agents who were untalented but
paid more than lower class agents who were talented. The reason was that statistically,
when talent was unobservable, they were a better bet to be talented. It was not whether
they were talented that mattered. What mattered was whether their background made
them look talented.
In this chapter we expand on the same story. There will be three main differences:
firstly, parental income (class) will not be observed perfectly but only with some noise;
talent will also be observable with noise; and both income and talent will follow a
normal distribution. We consider to what extent the dispersion of income, and its
correlation across generations, is related to the inheritance of advantages. In so doing
it attempts to go beyond a story of capital market imperfections and consider how firms
use the information available to them.
The correlation between intergenerational income mobility and inequality was re-
cently considered by Alan Krueger in a presentation he gave to the Center for American
Progress (Krueger (2012)). He discussed the “Great Gatsby Curve,” the literary name-
sake of which provides an example, of sorts, of upward mobility. Krueger’s illustration
1This chapter is based upon work I have undertaken for a paper of the same title which I am
coauthoring with José V. Rodŕıguez Mora at Edinburgh University
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Figure 2.1: Corak’s Great Gatsby Curve
drew on data provided by Miles Corak and Figure 2.1 reproduces Corak’s version of
the Great Gatsby Curve (Corak (2012)). Income inequality and the intergenerational
earnings elasticity are on the x- and y-axes respectively. We can see that more un-
equal countries have a greater correlation between the income of fathers and sons or,
put another way, that there is a negative correlation between income inequality and
mobility.
There exist several explanations for this negative correlation in the literature. One
such explanation is given by the “distance effect” in Hassler et al. (2007). In their
model, greater mobility leads to a long-run equilibrium in which there are fewer un-
skilled workers relative to skilled. This reduces the distance between their two incomes,
which is their measure of income inequality, and increases the ability of unskilled par-
ents to pay for the eduction of their children. This feeds back into increased mobility.
Another explanation is provided in Solon (2004). In Solon’s model, both intergenera-
tional income elasticity and inequality are a function of the same factors, including the
inheritance of income generating traits and more policy-related factors such as the pro-
gressivity of public human capital investment. This would again give rise to the upward
sloping line illustrated in figure 2.1. This paper will offer an alternative explanation –
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the inheritance of advantage.
To be clear, we are not talking, as Solon did, about the greater opportunity of the
children of the rich to accumulate talent. We assume that this is true, perhaps through
some sort of capital market imperfection allowing the rich to invest more in their
children’s development. We will look specifically at the underlying investment process
in chapter 3. What we are talking about is the greater efficacy with which the children
of the rich inherit the ability to look talented. This relates our paper to the literature on
statistical discrimination (such as Coate & Loury (1993) and Moro & Norman (2004)).
We differ from these papers in that our firms discriminate based on endogenously
determined variables and do so within a dynamic model. This naturally produces the
observed negative correlation between mobility and inequality. As income inequality
increases, people differ more, and it becomes easier to identify talented individuals
within society. As firms become more certain about who is talented and who is not, this
feeds back into income dispersion. This feedback mechanism may lead to multiplicity
of steady states. In addition, the better firms get at identifying talent, the lower is
mobility, both because the talented tend to be from rich backgrounds and because one
of the ways which firms identify talent is through information on family background.
These are the two key points which I would wish to highlight in this chapter. First,
that there exists a multiplier effect whereby increased inequality improves the infor-
mation available to firms when selecting workers, reducing mobility and encouraging
further inequality in the incomes that they pay. When there is strong inheritability, in
the sense that talent is closely related to family background, this can lead to multiplic-
ity. Second, that it implies a perverse effect of meritocracy: if a meritocratic society
is one in which firms can more readily identify the quality of workers and pay them
accordingly, this could decrease mobility. As a result, societies with meritocratic insti-
tutions (those in which it is easy to signal talent) should tend to have more inequality
and less mobility than those without. This is what we observe in the likes of the US
and UK, with a hierarchy of higher education institutions from the Ivy League and
Oxbridge downwards, compared to the Scandinavian countries with their more egali-
tarian educational institutions. I will elaborate further on these points in the models
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which follow.
2.1 Labour market sorting where firms receive a signal on
parental income
In this section we will consider how firms react to a signal on the parental income of
a worker. This is going to be relevant to the firm because parental income and talent






where τ is a worker’s talent, y−1 is his parent’s income, y−1 is the mean of parental




. The talent process is a function of parental income
and luck, where the extent of the role played by parental income is governed by the
parameter α > 0. Talent is the post-education, pre-labour force level of skill of a
worker, and its development has a tournament component which will keep average
talent centered on zero. We do not consider the factors underlying this relationship in
this chapter but you could imagine it being the result of capital market imperfections.
2.1.1 A firm’s beliefs about talent
There are firms which pay wages according to their beliefs about the talent an individual
has. Let θ1 be the information available to a firm. θ1 can be broken down into two
elements: µ, information on the distribution of income in the parents’ generation; and
s1, a signal on y−1 given by,
s1 = y−1 + εs1 (2.2)
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. This signal can be thought of as an observation on an indi-
vidual’s background: where they grew up, how they speak, how they dress, and so on.
Firms do not, at this stage, receive a direct signal on talent. We assume that the firm
knows the distributions of εs1 and ετ .
Using this information, the firm takes expectations of talent, conditional on the
information available, in the following way,




+ E (ετ |θ1) (2.3)
Since both µ and s1 are independent of ετ , the firms expectation of ετ conditional
on θ1 will be equal to zero and the firm can concentrate on forming beliefs on parental
income. To do this they initially form their prior, conditional on µ, and then update it
with the information contained in an individual’s signal using Bayesian inference. This











Substituting this back into equation 2.3 gives a posterior belief on talent of,













which is the coefficient from an OLS regression of τ on
s1
2. Thus the firms adjusts away from their prior belief (zero) and towards the signal
to the extent that a change in the signal implies a change in talent. When parental
income variance is high, the prior gives little information as people are very different.
The signal is more heavily used in determining the posterior and hence talent. When
parental income variance is zero, the prior gives perfect information and the signal is
2Since τ and s1 are bivariate normal it can also be read directly from the PDF of the conditional
distribution of τ .
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disregarded. The point, as we will see in the next section, is that income variance is
endogenous.
2.1.2 Steady State Beliefs
Suppose that firms set income equal to their belief about an individual’s talent having
observed their signal. They have no further opportunity to learn about the talent of
their worker. We will write this income as a linear function of the deviation of the
signal from its mean value.
y = E (τ |θ1) = β1 (s1 − s1)
where β1 can be read from equation 2.4. Since mean income is then zero in every
generation, this implies that the mean signal is zero. We can then write this equation
as
y = E (τ |θ1) = β1s1 (2.5)
β1 measures the optimal reaction of the firm to the signal. The more the firms
react to the signals, the more income variance there is. But, as we saw above, the more
income variance there is, the more value there is in the signal relative to the prior and
so the more the firms react to the signal. β1 both causes and is a reaction to income
variance.
By substitution from equation 2.2 we can calculate the variance of income as a
function of the variance in parental income and, by setting σ2y = σ
2
y−1 , the steady state








if β1 < 1
∞ if β1 ≥ 1
We can see that, at least up to a point, σ2y is a function of β1. We also know from





or, more generally, β1 is a function of σ
2
y (which we shall
call F (·)). Finding a steady state value of β1 is thus a matter of finding a fixed point
















αβ21 if β1 < 1
α if β1 ≥ 1
There are a maximum of three steady state values of β1: β1 = 0 will always be a
steady state; β1 = 1/α is a steady state when α is greater than one; and β1 = α is a
steady state when α is greater than one.
The simplest case is where α is less than one. In this instance there is only one
steady state value of β1 equal to zero, corresponding to a steady state income variance
of zero. This is very intuitive. If the firm pays every worker the same income then by
equation 2.1 their children’s’ talent will be distributed entirely by luck. By definition
the firm can infer nothing about luck through the signal, and so they ignore it and pay
all the children the same income. The case where α is less than one is shown in figure




. The economy will always tend to this
steady state.
When α is greater than or equal to one there still exists a steady state with no
income variance and no reaction by the firm to an individual’s signal. This is stable
in the sense that for small perturbations around zero the economy will return to this
steady state. There also exist two other steady states: there is an unstable steady state
where β1 is equal to
1
α ; and there is a stable steady state with β1 equal to α. We are
more interested in the latter. The situation where α is greater than one is shown in
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Figure 2.2: Steady State for α < 1
figure 2.3.
The stable steady state with β1 equal to α has income variance growing over time
towards infinity. As income variance in the economy becomes very high, incomes will
be so different that it will be perfectly evident who is the child of whom. As a result
the firm fully uses the signal to the extent that parental income tells them about talent
(α).
2.1.3 The feedback mechanism
The fact that two stable steady states may emerge is one of the main findings that we
will consider in the rest of this paper. When income variance is decreasing, firms care
less about the signal because people are increasingly similar and the signal is known
to be uninformative. They use it less and income variance continues to fall. When
income variance is increasing, firms care more about the signal because it is becoming
more informative and people more different. Increasingly there is an extra meaningful
dimension in which people differ. As firms use the signal more, this feeds back into
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Figure 2.3: Steady States for α > 1
greater income inequality. As a result of this latter process, there emerges of a portion
of the population who are rich and give advantages to their children that go beyond
their talents - the ability to display their privileged upbringing and be paid for it.
2.2 Labour market sorting where firms receive a signal on
talent
In the model of section 2.1 the information set of the firm consisted of two parts: µ,
prior information about the distribution of income in the parent’s generation; and s1, a
signal on parental income. In this section we consider the actions of a firm when faced
with an alternative information set θ2. They receive the same prior information but an
alternative signal, s2, on an individual’s talent given by,
s2 = τ + εs2 (2.6)
They do not receive signal s1. Talent is still given by equation 2.1 and income by
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E (τ |θ2). Later, we will model an improvement in meritocracy as a fall in σ2εs2 since
this improves the precision of the signal and allows talent to be better identified and
rewarded.
We calculate the posterior beliefs of the firm, given this new information, which
gives it beliefs about talent of,










The income that the firm pays a worker is a linear function of the new signal,
y = E (τ |θ2) = β2s2 (2.8)
where the value of β2 can be read from equation 2.7. From this we can quite easily
calculate the steady state income variance as a function of β2, remembering that σ
2
y =
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1 if β2 ≥ 1α
This is a similar result to what we found in section 2.1. There are up to two steady















We will call the lower of these β
2
and the higher β2. There is a third possible steady
state: β2 = 1 for values of β2 greater than
1
α . We will consider two possible cases: in





2.2.1 Steady state solutions where σ2ετ ≥ σ2εs2
The simplest case is where σ2ετ ≥ σ2εs2 . When this condition holds there is only ever
one steady state value of β2.
3 When the variance of talent is largely exogenous (σ2ετ is
3Begin by considering α = 1. The three possible steady states are then: β2 = β
2
= 1 for β2 < 1;




εs2 > 1 for β2 < 1; and β2 = 1 for β2 ≥ 1. The first two of these are contradictions,
leaving only one steady state with β2 = 1 and σ
2
y → ∞. An increase in α causes the G (β2) curve to
pivot upwards leaving the only steady state as β2 = 1. A decrease in α will cause β
2
to fall below
one, confirming it as a valid steady state value. β2 is ruled out once we consider that any steady state
solution must lie on the G (β2) curve which increases monotonically to a maximum value of one at
β2 = 1/α. Therefore any solution to β2 = G (β2) must have a solution with a value less than or equal
to one. A decrease in α below one would cause β2 to increase, and since it was already above one, this
rules it out as a steady state. β2 = 1 when β2 ≥ 1/α > 1 is also ruled out by contradiction. There is
therefore never multiplicity when σ2ετ ≥ σ2εs2 for any value of α.
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high), and the signal is precise (σ2εs2 is low), a firms decision over how much to use the
signal is largely independent of what other firms are doing. Since G (β2) measures the
firms response to the prevailing β2 in society it has little slope in this case. The steady
state solutions for α in various ranges are shown in figure 2.4.
2.2.2 Steady state solutions where σ2ετ < σ
2
εs2
Where σ2ετ < σ
2
εs2 there is a possibility that multiple steady state values of β2 exist.
Intuitively when σ2ετ is low and σ
2
εs2 is high, the variance in talent and quality of the
signal are largely driven by income variance. Since this is endogenously determined
by the prevailing β2 in society, any firm’s response to changes in the prevailing β2 is
greater than in the previous section. This is why G (β2) has a steeper slope and why
we may reach more than one steady state value of β2. This is illustrated in figure 2.5.
Qualitatively the situation is very similar to what we saw for β1 is section 2.1.
There are two stable steady states: one at β2 = β2 with finite income variance; and
one at β2 = 1 with income variance growing over time (towards infinity). We will refer
to these as the “low” and “high” (stable) steady states.









respectively, for which this multiplicity exists. For values of α less than one there is




εs2 . There is insufficient inheritance
(parental income is not an important enough driver of talent) for heavy use of the signal
to translate into high enough quality that this heavy use be sustained. For values of
α greater than α∗ there is only one steady state value of β2 equal to one. Here the
opposite is true. The additional quality of the talent signal generated by even a small
increase in the amount of income variance would be sufficient for the talent signal to
be used more and more.
The feedback mechanism works in a similar way to what we saw in section 2.1.3.
More income inequality leads to greater dispersion of talent. This in turn leads to
greater dispersion of the signals and more value being given to the signals by firms, the
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Figure 2.5: When 1 < α < α∗ and σ2ετ < σ
2
εs2 there are 3 steady states, 2 of which are
stable
combined effect of which is greater income inequality.
2.2.3 The curse of meritocracy I
We model an increase in meritocracy as a fall in σ2εs2 . This improves the quality of the
information which firms have about talent and makes them better able to pay workers
according to their talent. From figure 2.5 we can see that a fall in σ2εs2 causes the
intercept of G (β2) to increase and, since it must reach the same point at β2 = 1/α, the
slope to fall.4 β
2




αβ2 if β2 < 1/α
1 if β2 ≥ 1/α
4Formally, the slope of the G (β2) function is increasing in σ
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and so increases in the low steady state as σ2εs2 falls. Improvements in meritocracy
reduce mobility.
If we exogenously improve the quality of the signal, firms use it more, increasing the
variance of income and talent and further improving the quality of the signal (the feed-
back mechanism). As this happens, firms get better at identifying talented individuals
and paying them accordingly but these individuals tend to be from rich backgrounds,
reducing mobility. We produce the observed negative correlation between mobility and
inequality in the low steady state. The high steady state is unaffected.
2.3 Labour market sorting where firms receive two signals
In the previous sections we have considered the actions of a firm trying to work out the
talent of individual workers with the aid of two alternative information sets, θ1 and θ2.
We are now going to combine these so that the firm’s information set, which we will
now call θ′, has three parts; the prior, µ, based on information on the distribution of
income in the parents’ generation; signal s1 on parental income given by equation 2.2;
and signal s2 on talent given by equation 2.6. By reintroducing the signal on parental
income, we will show that this makes the curse of meritocracy worse. In addition to
firms being better able to pick out the talented, who happen to be predominantly from
rich backgrounds, they may also use the signal on parental income more.
We assume that talent is still given by equation 2.1. As before, the distributions of
the errors εs1 , εs2 and ετ are known to the firm and all are independently distributed.
Using Bayesian inference we can calculate the posterior beliefs of a firm conditional
on the new information set θ′. This gives a steady state posterior belief of,5
5The firm’s belief, given in equation 2.9 is a weighted average of three things: a prior on talent,
E (τ |µ), equal to zero; a belief about talent based solely on signal 1, E (τ |s1), equal to αs1; and a belief
about talent based solely on signal 2, E (τ |s2), equal to s2. As σ2y goes to infinity the prior is useless
and the weights given to the other parts sum to one. Similarly, if σ2εs1 equals zero then the prior is
useless since the first signal perfectly informs the firm about parental income. Again it is thrown away.
The weights given to other parts then reflect the extent to which parental income and the second signal
inform about talent and sum to one. When σ2εs2 is zero, only the second signal is used since it perfectly









































= β1s1 + β2s2 (2.10)
where β1 and β2 can be read from equation 2.9. They are the coefficients of a mul-














1− (β1 + αβ2)2
if β1 + αβ2 < 1
∞ if β1 + αβ2 ≥ 1
We now have three equations in three unknowns: one each for steady state values
of β1 and β2 as function of the income variance which can be read from equation 2.9;
and one for the steady state income variance as a function of β1 and β2. Unfortu-
nately finding analytical solutions to these three unknowns for finite income variance
is unmanageable. As such, we will proceed in a slightly different manner to before.





















= (β1 + αβ2)












Solving for σ2y = σ
2
y−1 gives steady state income variance.
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2.3.1 The firm’s choice of β1 when the value of β2 is fixed
Since it is very difficult to find an analytical solution for β1 when β2 and σ
2
y are both
being endogenously determined, what we do instead is to exogenously impose a value of
β2 and ask the question: If this were the value of β2 which firms faced, what value(s) of
β1 would they tend towards? This method allows us to draw a reaction correspondence
for β1 as a function of different exogenously imposed values of β2.
To carry out this method, first we need to know the firms’ choice of β1 when β2
is exogenous. In section 2.1 we noted that the posterior belief in equation 2.4 gave a
value of β1 equal to the coefficient from a regression of τ on s. This worked because
the OLS regressor was the value of β1 which minimised the variance of expected talent
around its true value, which also happens to be how a rational agent using Bayes rule
behaves. We use this result again here. The value of β1 which minimises the variance
of E (τ |θ′) around τ is found by solving the minimisation,
minβ1E (τ − β1s1 − β2s2)
2 (2.11)
which gives,






Fixing the value of β2 at zero shuts off the talent signal and returns us to the model
of section 2.1. Also, if β1 + αβ2 ≥ 1, we can see from above that income variance will
tend to infinity and β1 = α (1− β2). Since rearranging this gives β1 + αβ2 = α the
requirement for the existence of a steady state with growing variance is again α ≥ 1.
By substituting the steady state income variance and solving for β1, equation 2.12
gives the β̂1 reaction correspondence, where the “hat” indicates that this is the value
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of β1 that firms choose given an exogenously imposed value of β2.
2.3.2 The firm’s choice of β2 when the value of β1 is fixed
We proceed in exactly the same manner as in the previous section. First, we want to
solve the minimisation in equation 2.11 for β2 to give us the firm’s choice of β2 given
β1. Solving the minimisation gives,
β2 =







Substituting in the steady state income variance and solving for β2 gives us a
correspondence β̂2 which describes the firm’s choice of β2 in reaction to a particular
exogenously imposed value of β1. Setting β1 equal to zero cuts off the signal on parental
income and returns us to the model of section 2.2 where the first signal plays no role.
Also, when β1 + αβ2 ≥ 1 we again find that there is a steady state at which income
variance tends towards infinity and β1 + αβ2 = α.
2.3.3 A numerical example
The response correspondences in sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 do not easily lend themselves
to analytical solutions so a numerical analysis was carried out. The correspondences
were drawn for the parameter values: α = 1.1; σ2εs1 = 5; and σ
2
εs2 = 4; σ
2
ετ = 1. These
were chosen based on what had been learned from the one signal models – that to have
multiplicity we require: α to be larger than one but below some upper bound α∗; and
the variance in the signal errors (σ2εs1 and σ
2
εs2) to be large compared to the variance in
the error on talent (σ2ετ ). Figure 2.6 shows how the reaction correspondences look for
these parameter values. We have focussed only on non-negative, non-complex values
of β1 and β2.
Along the x- and y-axis, β1 and β2 are respectively fixed at zero. Thus the solutions
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Figure 2.6: An example of multiplicity in the two signal model
along the axes are as in sections 2.2 and 2.1 respectively. The highest of these solutions
are connected by the line β1 + αβ2 = α. From sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3 we can see that
the infinite variance solutions to both β̂1 and β̂2 lie on this line.
Where the two correspondences cross we find a finite variance steady state solution
for β1 and β2 with the firm choosing β1 as a best response to β2 and β2 as a best
response to β1. We find that there are two of these, one with relatively low values of
β1 and β2 and one with relatively higher ones. The lower one is stable while the higher
one is unstable.
The dynamics of the economy work as follows. Suppose β1 and β2 are fixed at
certain values. This will imply a certain income variance. Then imagine that at some
point in time firms are allowed to freely choose β1 and β2. They will do so taking
the current income variance as given (since it is our state variable). As a result they
act as if they were on the saddle path with the same variance as was created by the
initial (β1,β2) combination. This is given by the point at which the “isovariance” curve
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through this (β1,β2) cuts the saddle path. They will jump to a new point on the
saddle path, after which they continue to choose values of β1 and β2 which follow the
saddle path towards steady state. If the initial (β1,β2) was inside the higher of the
two isovariance curves illustrated, the economy will converge towards the lower stable
steady state (with finite variance). If it is outside this isovariance curve the economy
will converge towards the high stable steady state with growing income variance. The










It is worth noting that, where two stable steady states exist, it is always the case
that one has a lower level of both β1 and β2 and so there never exists two steady states
which substitute one signal for the other.
2.3.4 The curse of meritocracy II
In the two signal model, the intergenerational income correlation is given by,
ρy,y−1 =

β1 + αβ2 if β1 + αβ2 < 1
1 if β1 + αβ2 ≥ 1












1− (β1 + αβ2)2
Since the analytical solutions for β1 and β2 are unmanageable, and intergenerational
mobility and income inequality are functions of β1 and β2, it is also very difficult to
solve analytically the effects of a change in our exogenous parameters on them. We
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Parameter Values the parameter may take
α 0.1, 0.2, ..., 1.5
σ2εs1 1, 2, ..., 12
σ2εs2 1, 2, ..., 12
σ2ετ 0.5, 1.0, ..., 6.0
Table 2.1: Parameter values for the numerical exercise investigating the curse of meri-
tocracy
proceeded with a numerical analysis. First we will examine the effects of a fall in σ2εs2 .
This is again how we define an improvement in meritocracy. There are two forces at
work as σ2εs2 falls: given β1 and β2 a fall in the noise will decrease income variance
which will lead to a reduction in β1 and β2 as firms respond; but for a given income
variance a fall in σ2εs2 necessarily increases the use of the talent signal, which in turn
will increase income variance and the use of both signals.
We first define our parameter sets to be any combination of parameters from table
2.1. α may take any one of fifteen values, σ2εs1 any one of twelve, σ
2
εs2 one of twelve,
and σ2ετ one of twelve. This gives close to 26,000 possible combinations of parameters.
However for some of those with α greater than one, the finite variance steady state will
not exist. We eliminated these cases and were left with 17,918 parameter combinations
which produce a finite variance steady state.
For each of these steady states we decreased σ2εs2 by 0.001. We interpret this as
an exogenous marginal increase in meritocracy. In all 17,918 cases for which a finite
variance steady state existed, income variance and the intergenerational correlation of
incomes both increased. We graph the effect of increasing meritocracy on inequality and
mobility for a small number of different parameter sets in figure 2.7. Meritocracy was
measured as 1
σ2εs2
. The graph illustrates the increase in inequality and fall in mobility
which accompanies an increase in meritocracy. There are two possible reasons for the
fall in mobility: in all cases, the quality of the second signal has increased and so β2
increases. This was the effect described in section 2.2.3 where firms get better at picking
out the talented but they tend to be from rich backgrounds; additionally, in some cases
(all cases for which α > 1) the first signal is also used more, reducing mobility since it
directly relates to family background.
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Figure 2.7: The effect of increasing meritocracy on steady state income variance and
mobility
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Figure 2.8: The effect of increasing advantages on steady state income variance and
mobility
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We also investigated whether the correlation of an individual’s talent and income
increased with a fall in σ2εs2 . If it did not, a fall in σ
2
εs2 would not be a useful way of
exogenously shocking meritocracy. It occurred in all cases.
In addition to investigating the effects of meritocracy we consider the effect of
inherited advantages. An exogenous increase in inherited advantages was defined as a
fall in σ2εs1 . With a fall in σ
2
εs1 , it is easier for firms to identify parental income and,
since parental income is correlated with talent, to pay higher incomes to those from
richer backgrounds. Thus the advantages of a rich background (and disadvantages of
a poor background) are greater. We decreased σ2εs1 by 0.001 and examined the effects
for the parameter sets given in table 2.1. In all 17,981 cases for which a finite variance
steady state existed, income variance, the intergenerational correlation of incomes, and
the correlation of talent and income increased. Figure 2.8 illustrates how increases in
advantages related to background (defined as 1
σ2εs1
) lead to greater income inequality
and lower intergenerational mobility.
In summary, an increase in the precision of either signal (an increase in meritocracy
or advantages related to background) will lead to greater income inequality and further
increases in both meritocracy and advantages related to background. This is because
the endogenous response of firms to the more precise information is to use one or both
of the signals more. We might have expected that when firms are better informed about
an individual’s talent, they would care less about his background. We show that more
often than not (and in all cases where there is sufficient inheritance) this is not true and
that even when it is true, mobility still falls due to increased use of the talent signal.
2.4 A discrete model with finite income variance
Until now this chapter has used a model where income and talent were continuous
and normally distributed. It has been shown, using three variations on the normal
model, how multiplicity may exist, producing two stable steady state outcomes. In the
low steady state there was finite income variance, while the high steady state tended
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towards infinite income variance. Although the analysis concentrated on the low steady
state, the existence of the infinite variance high steady state seems less realistic. We
now turn to a model with discrete levels of income, which will provide a simple example
of some of the features of the normal model, without the high variance steady state
exhibiting infinite steady state income variance.
As in section 2.3, firm’s are still unable to observe talent and receive two signals
about each worker: the first, which we will call sr, is a signal on parental income (r
represents a rich background); the second, st, is a signal on talent. In a departure from
the previous model, these signals can only take values of one or zero and their quality
will be determined exogenously. Since there are two signals, each of which can take one
of two values, there are four “types” of individual. Yrt gives the income of each type,
for example Y11 is the income of a type 11 worker (one for whom sr = 1 and st = 1).
Talent, τ , is discrete and only able to take values one or zero. If an individual’s
parent is sufficiently rich, it is more likely to take a value of one. The probability of
being talented is given by,
P (τ = 1) =

αs + µs (1− αs) if Ỹrt > K̃ 0 ≤ αs ≤ 1
µs if Ỹrt = K̃





K̃ is average talent in the parent’s generation which, as we will see below, is equal
in steady state to average income in the parent’s generation. Those whose parent has
above average income are more likely to be talented than those whose parent has below
average income. αs is a parameter controlling inheritance. When αs is zero, everyone
has the same probability of being talented, µs, irrespective of who their parent is. When
αs is one, for everyone other than those on the threshold, talent is entirely determined
by parental “type”. Srt is defined to be the probability of being talented conditional
on parental income Ỹrt.
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As before, the first signal is on parental income. We will call an individual who
looks like she is from a rich background (sr = 1) “advantaged”, while one who looks
like she is from a poor background (sr = 0) will be termed “disadvantaged”. An
individual’s likelihood of being advantaged is increased if her parent is sufficiently rich.
The probability of being advantaged is given by,
P (sr = 1) =

αr + µr (1− αr) if Ỹrt > (1 + λ) K̃ 0 ≤ αr ≤ 1, 0 ≤ λ
µr if Ỹrt = (1 + λ) K̃





Ỹrt represents parental income so the first line states that an individual’s chances
of being advantaged are larger if her parent has an income above (1 + λ) K̃. λ is a
parameter controlling how rich your parent needs to be, relative to the average, in
order to increase your chances of being advantaged. αr is a parameter which controls
the quality of the signal. If αr is zero then the signal is randomly distributed in the
population and hence not correlated with, or informative about, parental income. If αr
is one, the signal tells exactly whose parents have income above and below the threshold
(1 + λ) K̃. Rrt is defined to be the probability that an individual is advantaged given
her parent’s income is Yrt.
Finally, the second signal, st, is a signal on talent. We will refer to an individual
who looks talented (st = 1) as “promising”, since he is an attractive prospect to a firm,
while one which looks untalented (st = 0) will be referred to to as “unpromising”. The
probability that an individual is promising is given by,
P (st = 1) =

αt + µt (1− αt) if τ = 1 0 ≤ αt ≤ 1
µt (1− αt) if τ = 0
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This states that an individual is more likely be promising if he is actually talented
and unpromising if he is not. αt measures the quality of the signal, where zero is
completely uninformative and one completely informative. It is going to be our measure
of meritocracy, which will increase as αt goes from zero to one.
In what follows we are going to make the simplifying assumptions that µs = µr =
µt = µ.
2.4.1 Steady state conditions
Let πrt represent the fraction of the population which are of that type. In steady state
πrt is constant across generations. We will begin with π11, the proportion of individuals
who are both advantaged and promising. The probability that an individual is of type
11 depends on what type their parent is and what their probability of being 11 is
conditional on their parents type. This gives,7
P (sr = 1, st = 1) = π11
= µ (1− αt) [R11π̃11 +R10π̃10 +R01π̃01 +R00π̃00]
+ αt [R11S11π̃11 +R10S10π̃10 +R01S01π̃01 +R00S00π̃00]
7The proportion of the population which is advantaged and promising is given by,

















































= R11 [αtS11 + µ (1− αt)] π̃11 +R10 [αtS10 + µ (1− αt)] π̃10
+R01 [αtS01 + µ (1− αt)] π̃01 +R00 [αtS00 + µ (1− αt)] π̃00
= µ (1− αt) [R11π̃11 +R10π̃10 +R01π̃01 +R00π̃00]
+ αt [R11S11π̃11 +R10S10π̃10 +R01S01π̃01 +R00S00π̃00]

















= π̃rt since all parents of type rt are paid an in-
come Yrt.
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We define a steady state to be one in which the proportion of each type is constant
over time (i.e. πrt = π̃rt). We will also define a variable A, which is the proportion of
the population which is both advantaged and talented, and is given by,
A = R11S11π11 +R10S10π10 +R01S01π01 +R00S00π00
Then our first steady state condition is,
π11 = αtA+ µ (1− αt) [R11π11 +R10π10 +R01π01 +R00π00]
Next we want to find the steady state solution for π10, the proportion of the popula-
tion that is advantaged but unpromising. To do so we will actually find the proportion
that are advantaged which equals the unconditional probability that sr = 1. This
gives,8
P (sr = 1) = π11 + π10
= R11π̃11 +R10π̃10 +R01π̃01 +R00π̃00
By letting πrt = π̃rt and substituting our second steady state equation into our
first, we are left with the following two steady state conditions:
π11 = αtA+ µ (1− αt) [π11 + π10] (2.15)
8The proportion of the population which is advantaged is given by,


































= R11π̃11 +R10π̃10 +R01π̃01 +R00π̃00
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π11 + π10 = R11π11 +R10π10 +R01π01 +R00π00 (2.16)
We derive our next steady state equation by focussing on the proportion of the
population which is promising. First, K is the proportion of the population which is
talented and so, in steady state, is given by,
K = P (τ = 1) = S11π11 + S10π10 + S01π01 + S00π00
Using K, we find the following equation for the steady state proportion of promising
individuals,9
π11 + π01 = αtK + µ (1− αt) (2.17)
Our last steady state equation draws on the fact that the πrt terms for each gener-
ation must sum to one and so,
π11 + π10 + π01 + π00 = 1 (2.18)
Equations 2.15 through 2.18 can be solved for the four unknowns (π11, π10, π01 and
π00) to give the steady state proportions of each type in the population.
9The proportion of the population which is promising is given by,
P (st = 1) = π11 + π01
= P (st = 1|τ = 1)P (τ = 1) + P (st = 1|τ = 0)P (τ = 0)
= [αt + µ (1− αt)]K + µ (1− αt) (1−K)
= αtK + µ (1− αt)
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2.4.2 The steady state income distribution
Once we have established the steady state distribution of types we can easily define
the steady state income which each type receives. We assume that incomes are paid
to each type according to the probability that they are talented conditional on their
observables. So the income of a type 11 individual will be given by,10
Y11 = P (τ = 1|sr = 1, st = 1) =
[αt + µ (1− αt)]A
π11
(2.19)
By the same logic,
Y10 = P (τ = 1|sr = 1, st = 0) =
(1− αt) (1− µ)A
π10
(2.20)
Y01 = P (τ = 1|sr = 0, st = 1) =
[αt + µ (1− αt)] (K −A)
π01
(2.21)
Y00 = P (τ = 1|sr = 0, st = 0) =
(1− αt) (1− µ) (K −A)
π00
(2.22)
Any solution to equations 2.15 through 2.22 gives a full characterisation of a steady
state distribution of income (π11, π10, π01, π00, Y11, Y10, Y01, Y00). Equations 2.19
through 2.22 can also be used to show that average income is equal to K11.
10The probability that a type 11 individual is talented is given by,
P (τ = 1|sr = 1, st = 1) =
P (sr = 1, st = 1|τ = 1)P (τ = 1)
P (sr = 1, st = 1)
=


















[αt + µ (1− αt)]
π11
=
[αt + µ (1− αt)]A
π11
11Average income, Y , is given by Y11π11 + Y10π10 + Y01π01 + Y00π00 = A+ (K −A) = K
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2.4.3 An Example
The goals of this chapter, and the focus of the earlier model, were two-fold: to demon-
strate the multiplier effect whereby raising income inequality improved information on
workers’ quality and caused firms to pay more varied wages. Where there was sufficient
inheritance this led to multiplicity; and secondly, to demonstrate that a more meri-
tocratic society, defined as one in which firms are better informed of worker quality,
displays lower mobility. When both of these points are combined, we see that a society
in which firms are better informed will lead to both greater inequality and less mobility
in a natural way. We now plan to demonstrate these points within our discrete model,
without having infinite income variance in the high steady state.
The feedback mechanism
We begin by setting αt equal to zero (with λ > 0). This means that the signal on talent
is randomly distributed amongst society and hence uncorrelated with actual talent. It
is disregarded by the firm. This is the situation that was previously described in section
2.1. I will use an X subscript to indicate that a signal is irrelevant so, for example, Y1X
is the income of an individual who is advantaged when the talent signal is not being
used by the firm. In this situation, there can be at most two income levels where firms
discriminate amongst workers based on whether or not they are advantaged.
When αt is equal to zero, the simplest steady state occurs where both income levels
lie below the income threshold (1 + λ)K. This implies that all individuals have the
same probability of being advantaged, and so being advantaged or not is not a useful
signal to the firm. They disregard it, along with the talent signal, and pay everyone
the same income, K. This common income level can be shown to equal µ since,
K = P (τ = 1) = P
(







This steady state is illustrated in figure 2.9(a) and essentially describes the same
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Figure 2.9: The steady states of the economy when αt equals zero. There are two
possibilities: (a) everyone has the same probability of being advantaged and so everyone
receives the same income; (b) some people are more likely to be advantaged than others
and the advantaged are paid more.
steady state as the zero variance case in section 2.1. This steady state will always exist.
There is an alternative steady state which can be reached where there are two
groups of individuals with different probabilities of being advantaged. For this to be
a steady state, it must be that the two incomes are sufficiently different so that one
group is more likely to be both advantaged and talented, implying advantage is a useful
signal of talent. This implies we require that Y1X > (1 + λ)K and that Y0X < K. It is
relatively easy to show that should such a steady state exist there would be a proportion
µ of the population who are advantaged and a proportion µ who are talented. The level
of incomes would be given by,
Y1X = αrαs + µ (1− αrαs)
Y0X = µ (1− αrαs)
This steady state is illustrated in figure 2.9(b). When the advantaged group is more
likely to be talented, they are paid more, implying they are more likely to be talented.
It is similar to the high steady state in section 2.1. In particular, this steady state will
not always exist (the advantaged group need to be paid sufficiently more) but is more
likely the greater is the inheritability of talent through parental income.12
12This steady state exists if λ < αrαs(1−µ)
µ
, so a higher value of αs will improve the likelihood of
multiplicity as in section 2.1.
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Figure 2.10: The steady states of the economy when αt is larger than zero but less than
λµ
1−µ
The curse of meritocracy I
We now turn our attention to demonstrating how improvements in meritocracy may
lead to increased inequality and falling mobility. To do so, we will focus on the low
steady state illustrated in figure 2.9(a). We will increase meritocracy by increasing
αt, the parameter which governs the information which firms have on an individual’s
talent. The resulting steady state is illustrated in figure 2.10.
As we increase αt above zero, we produce an economy in which there are two groups
of individuals, one of which is more likely to be talented and hence more likely to be
promising. The probability of being advantaged is the same for everyone. We can see
that the proportion in the promising group in steady state is given by,
P (st = 1) = πX1 = αtK + µ (1− αt)
Similarly we can show that the proportion of talented individuals is given by,
P (τ = 1) = K = αsπX1 + µ (1− αs)
Solving these two equations we find that a proportion µ of the population is promis-
ing and that a proportion µ of the population is talented. The correlation between the
membership of these two groups will determine the extent to which the signal is useful
to the firm. This is determined by αt. It is easy to show that the incomes which the
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firms will pay are given by,
YX1 = P (τ = 1|st = 1) = αt + µ (1− αt)
YX0 = P (τ = 1|st = 0) = µ (1− αt)
The difference in the income paid to the two groups depends on the quality of
the information available to the firm, αt. As we increase αt, YX1 increases and YX0
decreases. In addition, as a higher income is paid to those who are promising (those
who are more likely to be talented), and those who are promising tend to come from
richer backgrounds, this reduces mobility. The increase in income dispersion and fall
in mobility due to increased use of the talent signal are the same effects as we saw in




The curse of meritocracy II
Finally, we want to consider what happens when αt reaches
λµ
1−µ . At this point, YX1
reaches the threshold (1 + λ)µ and the probability of being advantaged jumps from
µ (1− αF ) to µ for the children of the rich. The fact that some of those from rich back-
grounds, who are more likely to be talented, are also now more likely to be advantaged,
means that both signals are now useful to the firm. There are four income groups
formed by each of our previous groups, YX1 and YX0, splitting in two. The advantaged
members of each group move to a higher steady state income, while the disadvantaged
in each group move to a lower steady state income. At this point there are several
steady states which the economy could jump to. I will focus attention on one.14 This
is the one where Y01 and Y10 do not jump far from YX1 and YX0 respectively so that
Y10 < K < Y01 < (1 + λ)K.
15 This is illustrated in figure 2.11. K is again equal to µ.
13At this point YX1 reaches the threshold at which the parental income signal starts to have some
value. Although we did not restrict λ, we will assume that this threshold is less than one otherwise we
would never leave this steady state.
14The goal of this section is not to fully characterise all the possible steady state income distributions
but instead to provide simple examples of the effects described earlier in the chapter.
15For this to be the steady state that is reached at αt =
λµ










Figure 2.11: One steady state of the economy when αt is equal to
λµ
1−µ
As could happen in in the normal version of the model, we observe complementarity
between the two signals. As we improve the quality of the signal on talent, there will
come a point where the firm begins to use the signal on parental income. This is shown
in figure 2.11. At the point where firms begin using a person’s advantage to place
them in a job there will be a discrete fall in mobility. This is brought about by the
increased inequality associated with improved meritocracy. The idea that meritocracy
can simultaneously increase inequality and lower mobility was one of the central themes
in the previous sections of this chapter.
2.5 An extension
Throughout this chapter we have assumed that firms pay workers a wage equal to their
expected talent at the point of entrance into the workforce. There is no further op-
portunity for them to learn about their worker’s talent. There is a strand of literature
which investigates whether, if firms statistically discriminate when sorting new workers,
the effects of this discrimination fade as firms observe their worker’s ability on-the-job
(Farber & Gibbons (1996); Altonji & Pierret (2001)). Most of this literature has inves-
tigated whether a schooling signal is used by firms in the absence of better information
on talent, although a paper by Arcidiacono et al. (2008) also looks at race.
A simple way to include such considerations in our framework would be to have
the (lifetime) income of an individual be a weighted average of his talent and expected
talent.
y = Ψτ + (1−Ψ)E (τ |s1, s2)
60
The role played by expected talent reflects the times when the worker’s ability is
unobservable to his firm and so it relies on observable signals. The relative weight given
to expected talent, (1−Ψ), would indicate the amount of time that the worker spends
in this situation during his lifetime, and hence things such as the speed of learning by
employers (the subject of a paper by Lange (2007)). This change would reduce, but
not eliminate, the role of signalling. This chapter has investigated the situation where
Ψ = 0. It would be interesting to see for which other values of Ψ the above conclusions
hold.
2.6 Conclusions
In this model, inequality leads to discrimination because when people are more different,
the signals they provide are more informative. This discrimination feeds back into
inequality. This feedback mechanism may lead to multiplicity of steady states, one
with a relatively small amount of discrimination and inequality and one with a relatively
large amount of discrimination and ever increasing inequality.
There exists a negative correlation between inequality and mobility, which was
observed in Corak’s “Great Gatsby Curve”. We believe this may occur for two reasons:
the increased discrimination which accompanies greater inequality results in firms being
better able to identify talent, which is correlated with parental income; and it may
result in them using family background information more. This move towards greater
inequality and lower mobility may be started by an exogenous increase in the degree
of meritocracy in society, which improves the quality of information available to firms,
feeding into discrimination and inequality.
This model can also be used to investigate the effects of a particular policy: early
childhood intervention. We could model the early intervention as a way of relieving the
credit constraints on poorer families through an extension of public education. This
would weaken the relationship between talent development and parental income, which
in this model refers to a fall in α. This pre-school investment would lead to a weakening
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of the relationship between talent and parental income, making the parental income
signal less useful, lowering discrimination and in turn lowering inequality and raising
mobility.
The intention here is not to advocate such a policy or to presuppose the outcome
of a welfare analysis, but instead to consider the effects of this intervention. Early
childhood interventions have been considered in the literature, particularly by James
Heckman and co-authors (such as Cunha & Heckman (2007) and Heckman & Masterov
(2007)), who concluded that complementarity and self-productivity of skills developed
at different points during childhood make early interventions effective at reducing in-
equality. We reach the same conclusion, but inequality is reduced by early interventions
limiting the availability of information upon which discrimination is based. It is a very
different mechanism. The following chapter will consider the welfare implications of a
similar model, but it is worth noting what this model implies about reductions in α:
by weakening the link between parental income and talent development, it increases




In chapter 2 we considered the effects of statistical discrimination in labour markets.
Firms had a limited information set available to them, and they pieced together a belief
about an individual’s talent by weighting the information that they had according to
its precision. This statistical discrimination fed through to income inequality, but also
fed off past inequality. In order to keep that model simple, and to show in a stark way
how that feedback mechanism worked, it was limited to two key variables, income and
talent, and three key concepts, inequality, intergenerational mobility, and meritocracy.
How these three aggregate measures of the state of our economy interacted was the
focus of that chapter.
The aim of this chapter is to build on that framework a mechanism which permits
forward-looking behaviour. If we look through the more recent statistical discrimination
literature we see that it is this forward-looking mechanism which determines equilibrium
behaviour. For example, consider the discriminating equilibrium in Coate & Loury
(1993). It is the belief of black workers that firms will use their race to sort them
that prevents them from investing in the skills that would prevent firms from doing
so. Up until now we have not considered the forward-looking investment behaviour of
optimising agents. This will be the focus of chapter 3. We will build on top of the
model from chapter 2, with its potential for multiplicity of steady states, the Coate
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and Loury mechanism whereby agents’ expectations of the return to investment in
skills affect their decision over investment. While this creates the potential for multiple
self-fulfilling equilibria, we will see that in this model, that is not observed.
In order to build in investment decisions, I am going to alter the model in one
key way. The distribution of income is going to be modelled as lognormal rather than
normal. Parents will be the optimising agents, each choosing how much to invest in
their child’s talent development (education). They are going to be credit constrained.
As a result their investment will be a function of their income, and in order to keep
investments confined to the set of non-negative real numbers we want incomes to be non-
negative. Hence we use the lognormal income distribution. It has the additional feature
of adding more realism to the model. Section 3.1 will derive the optimal investment
rule for parents. It is to invest a fraction of their income. The rule will be discussed in
section 3.2.
This version of the model will also allow for growth in mean income. The model
in the second chapter was primarily concerned with the variance and correlation of
incomes and so we abstracted from changes in mean income. Again, this will add some
additional realism to the model.
This chapter will proceed in the following way: first, we will derive an optimal
investment rule which governs parents’ investment in their children’s education; second
we will show that this is unique and why this uniqueness comes about; finally, given the
investment rule, and the income process which it implies, we will look at some features of
the economy and how they change following an exogenous improvement in meritocracy
or inherited advantages. A key finding is that, for certain sets of parameters, a risk
averse agent may have lower utility on average in a country with higher mean income
and greater meritocracy, if that meritocracy brings with it greater variance, and hence
uncertainty, over income.
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3.1 An optimal investment rule for children’s education
We will begin with an equation describing the formation of talent. In this case we
are going to consider the log of talent, where talent is lognormally distributed. As
in the previous chapters, an individual’s level of talent describes their skill level after
education and before entering the labour force, and so is dependent on their human
capital formation as a child. Our assumption is that this depends on the income level
of their parent when they are growing up and the level of investment which their parent
makes in them (we assume that each parent has one child). There is an underlying
credit constraint which states that it is impossible to borrow in order to invest in
your child. Hence, coming from a rich background is beneficial not only through the
environment of your childhood but because it better enables your parent to invest in
your development. The equation for the log of talent is given by,
lnτ = φ+ αylny−1 + αxlnx+ ετ (3.1)
where τ is an individual’s talent, y−1 is his parent’s income level, x is the investment
which his parent chose to make in him, and ετ is a mean zero normally distributed error
with variance σ2ετ . φ is a constant term, while αx and αy are the parameters which
govern the advantages which come from being part of a rich family. In sections 3.4 and
3.5 we will refer to an economy with “low” values of αx and αy (αx+αy < 1) as a weak
inheritance economy and one with “high” values (αx + αy ≥ 1) as a strong inheritance
economy.
We will call x̂ (y−1) the equilibrium investment rule but we will not assume any
structure on it. Instead we will allow for any investment rule and solve the parent’s
investment choice problem to find the structure that it has in equilibrium. The equi-
librium investment rule is known to all.
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3.1.1 The pay decisions of firms
As outlined in the introduction, we are going to assume in this chapter that income







If there were no additional information available to the firm, they would believe
everyone to be of average log income and the precision in their beliefs would be 1/σ2y−1 .
Suppose there are two signals available to the firm which provide some information
on a worker’s talent. The first is a noisy signal of her parent’s income given by s1 =
y−1e
εs1 where εs1 is a mean zero normally distributed error with variance σ
2
εs1 . Neither
this signal nor the prior provide the firm with any information about the error in talent,
ετ but, as in the chapter 2 model, they do allow the firm to form a belief about parental
income which is itself a signal of talent. Firms, as before, form a posterior belief about
log parental income conditional on the signal s1. The distribution of these posterior




















We will refer to the mean of this distribution as µy−1|s1 . It is the firm’s belief about
the parental income of an individual with signal s1. We will refer to the variance as
σ2y−1|s1 . The precision in the firm’s belief is therefore 1/σ
2
y−1|s1 .
Given the human capital development function in (3.1), firms can form a belief
about talent based on their posterior beliefs about parental income. They must con-
sider how much parental investment the individual received and in doing so take the
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equilibrium investment rule as given. Let µx|x̂ be the firms’ belief about an individual’s
lnx, given the investment rule, and σ2x|x̂ be the variance in those beliefs. Although the
equilibrium investment rule will be known to the firm, parental income is only known
with some error which leads to the variance in their beliefs about investment. µx|x̂ and
σ2x|x̂ are known to all.
This gives the following conditional distribution of talent,
lnτ |s1 ∼ N
(













Here σy−1|s1,x|x̂ is the covariance of the firm’s belief about a parent’s income, con-
ditional on the parental income signal, and their belief about the investment that the
parent has made, given the equilibrium investment rule. There is a statistical advan-
tage to looking like you are from a privileged background, both directly and through
the investment you will be believed to have received.
The second signal is a noisy signal on the individual’s talent given by s2 = τe
εs2
where εs2 is a mean zero normally distributed error with variance σ
2
εs2 . Each firm is now
in a position to choose what weights to give to their beliefs based on the the information
they have about an individual’s parental income (µy−1 , s1) and the information they
have about her talent (s2). This gives the following result:


































The firms’ posterior belief about talent is a weighted average of their beliefs con-
ditional on the first and second signals. The weight is given by β2. As in the previous
chapter, β2 will measure the extent to which firms reacts to changes in the talent sig-
nal. Since in equilibrium the distribution of the firm’s beliefs about investment will be
common knowledge, so will be the constant β2.
We are now in a position to consider a payment rule for the firm. As in chapter
2, the firm will pay a wage based on their expectations of the talent of an individual.
For any lognormally distributed variable z with E (lnz) = µz and V ar (lnz) = σ
2
z , the
expected value of z is equal to eµz+
σ2z
2 . It follows that the conditional expectation of
talent is,










And so, if firms pay incomes equal to their conditional expectation of talent, lny is
lny = [1− β2]
[








This is the log income which an individual will receive. She will receive a higher
income if the firm believes her parent to have been richer, both because of the direct
effect of parental income on human capital development and because, given the equi-
librium investment rule, richer parents may be believed to invest more. She will also
receive a higher income if she looks more talented via the direct signal on talent, s2.
We will now consider how parents invest and hence what the equilibrium investment
rule is.
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3.1.2 The investment decisions of parents
Parents choose how much to invest in their child. In order to know how they do that,
we must define for a parent a particular value function. This is given by,









y−1 ≥ c−1 + x
Parents gain utility from their own consumption and from the expected value which
their child will have, and make their consumption-investment choice optimally given
their income. δ is the discount rate. Parent’s know their own income and investment
choice and so condition on them when taking expectations of their child’s value func-
tion. We also include a credit constraint whereby parents are unable to borrow. They
can consume themselves or invest in their children, but solely through educational in-
vestment. Since they are maximising utility we assume that this constraint is binding.
We proceed with a guess and verify strategy. We guess that the value function is
of the following form,
V (y) = Alny +B
Conditional on this proving to be the case, we can find a parent’s expectation of
their child’s value function. Performing the maximisation in equation 3.5 then allows
the Euler equation to be found.1
1I will presume here the independence of A from lny and both A and B from x. The investment









E [·] is the expectations operator. The last term describes the expected return on
the investment of the parent. Firms’ take as given that parent’s invest according to the
equilibrium investment rule. There is no way for a parent to signal if they have deviated
from it and, by definition, no reason to do so without such a signal (when firms take
the rule as given, following the rule solves the parent’s maximisation in equation 3.5).
Hence the marginal effect of investment in a child is independent of the beliefs that
firms have on marginal investment. The only effect which investment has on a child’s
income is through their talent development which they can signal through s2. We can
see this by taking expectations of the income process described in equation 3.4.





















Examining the above expectation of log income, the only place where the chosen
investment level plays a role is in the penultimate term. This term is the expected
value of lns2. A parent expects a marginal increase in investment to raise their child’s
income only to the extent that they expect it to make them appear more talented.
They do not expect it to change the firms’ belief about how much they have invested.
Firms take the equilibrium investment rule as given and parents have no way of making
themselves look richer.
Solving the Euler equation provides the optimal investment choice of a parent. This
is the equilibrium investment rule.




(1 + δ) + αxβ2E [A]
y−1 (3.6)
An equilibrium investment rule is one for which the following statement holds: given
that firms expect individuals to invest according to the equilibrium investment rule, the
optimal choice of investment is in accordance with the equilibrium investment rule. We
have shown so far that given any investment rule which firms believe individuals are
following, the optimal investment for a parent is a constant fraction of their income. It
then follows that investing a constant fraction of income is an equilibrium investment
rule: given that firms believe individuals to be investing a fraction λ of their income
in their children, the optimal investment for parents to make is a fraction λ of their
income.
Furthermore, since investing a fraction λ of their income is the optimal investment
strategy irrespective of the rule firms believe they are following, this is a unique in-
vestment rule. There is no other rule which firms would ever believe parents to be
following, nor is there any other rule which parents would ever choose to follow.
3.1.3 Solving the equilibrium payment and investment rules
We can see that, if the guess about the value function is correct, parents spend a
fraction of their income investing in their child. We are calling this fraction λ. Based
on this result,
µx|x̂ = lnλ+ µy−1|s1
and




The firms belief about how much you are investing in your child is equal to a
constant plus their belief about your income, conditional on the signal it receives about
your income. By substitution back into equation 3.4 we find that,




















































This defines the optimal payment rule for firms. The mean of lny is given by
the mean (log) talent, adjusted by the variance in the conditional distribution of τ .
Workers will be believed to be worth average (log) income unless they have above
or below average signals. An above or below average signal will cause the firm to
adjust their beliefs to the extent that the signal is informative. This is captured by the
precision of the signals through β1 and β2.
For example, as σ2εs2 tends to infinity, the second signal is of no use to the firms.
They disregard it. Alternatively, if σ2εs2 were to be zero, the second signal would be
perfect and the firms would completely ignore the first signal. In an equivalent fashion
to chapter 2, β1 and β2 are the coefficients from a multivariate regression of lnτ against
lns1 and lns2, the only difference being the use of the log terms. Substituting for lns1














+ β1εs1 + β2 (εs2 + ετ )
(3.10)
This is the income that an individual will earn, given his parents income, and the
realisation of the shocks to his talent and signals. Inherent in this is that parents invest
according to the equilibrium investment rule. The last thing that we need to do then
is check that our value function guess was correct and find the equilibrium investment
rule.
From equation 3.5 we can see that our value function, given the investment rule,
will be of the form,
V−1 (y−1) = ln (1− λ) + lny−1 +
E [A]
[






This is of the desired form, V−1 (y−1) = A−1lny−1 + B−1, and so verifies that our
guess was correct where,
A−1 = 1 +
1
1 + δ
E [A] [β1 + (αx + αy)β2]
and,
















E [A] and E [B] are the parent’s expectation of the parameters of the child’s value
function. Since the parent cares about the child’s utility, and makes an investment
choice which can potentially raise or lower the child’s income, they must form and
expectation of how the child’s income impacts on his utility. For example, in the
equation for A, the value of an increase in income to the parent is greater to the
extent that he can pass it on to his child (β1 + (αx + αy)β2) and to the extent that he
expects doing so to raise his child’s utility (E [A]). Appendix A shows that E [A] and
E [B] are finite valued and how they depend on future discrimination. Since β1 and β2
follow deterministic paths, the appendix shows that A and B are actually known with
certainty and what those values are equal to.
The equilibrium investment rule is given by equation 3.6. By substituting for A
from equation A.1 in Appendix A, we find the investment rule as a function of the




















The investment rule depends on β’s in two ways. The term αxβ2 governs the channel
through which you can influence the income of your child by raising their talent. This
is the only way that you can influence the income of your child. In addition, the β
terms for every generation from your grandchildren onwards are included, appropriately
discounted. They matter because investment in your child increases the opportunity
for them to provide advantages to future generations, but only if future generations
of firms discriminate based in those advantages. Note that advantages created for
generations from your grandchildren onwards can come through raising their level of
talent, or through raising the income of their parents (something you cannot do for
your own children).
By substitution from the steady state investment rule given in equation A.2 we get
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1 + δ − (β∗1 + αyβ∗2)
y−1 (3.12)
In order for the model to be a reasonable simplification of how individuals act,
we must constrain [β∗1 + (αx + αy)β
∗
2 ] to be less than (1 + δ). This ensures that: an
individual’s income has a positive, finite effect on his value function in steady state;
and there is an interior solution to the consumption-investment problem whereby the
fraction of income invested (or consumed) is between 0 and 1. We can see, to some
extent, what effect this constraint will have. δ measures the extent to which parents
care for their children’s expected wellbeing versus their own, αy and αx measure the
returns to parental income and investment in terms of developing talent, and β∗1 and β
∗
2
the (endogenous) returns to the parental income and talent signals in terms of income.
In order to ensure an interior solution to the parent’s consumption-investment problem
we constrain their willingness to invest in their child or the advantages of coming from
a rich background to be below some upper bound.2
Since we have not established how β1 and β2 change with the various parameters
of the model, we will investigate how changes in the parameters feed through to the
investment rule in the discussion section of this chapter. The parameter δ plays no role
in β∗1 and β
∗
2 so we can say at this stage that increases in the discount rate lead to a
smaller share of parental income being invested in steady state. This is very intuitive.
3.2 The investment rule
The equilibrium investment rule is one of the novel features of this chapter. In chapter 2
we considered the effects of marginal decreases in σ2εs1 and σ
2
εs2 , exogenously increasing
2The largest value that β1 + (αx + αy)β2 can take is αx + αy. This occurs as σ
2
y grows towards
infinity. αx + αy < 1 + δ is a sufficient condition to ensure that A > 0 and 0 < x < 1.
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the precision of signals 1 and 2 respectively. The result which we found was that,
although β1 and β2 did not necessarily shift in the same direction for a given change,
the overall effect of an increase in the precision of either signal was an increase in
inequality and a fall in mobility. We are now going to consider the effects of these same
changes on the payment rule of firms in more detail.
Firms’ response to changes in the precision of our signals can be considered in
much the same way as consumers respond to a price fall in standard consumer choice
theory. According to consumer choice theory with two normal goods, a fall in the price
of one good leads to both a substitution effect and an income effect. The good which
experiences the price fall unequivocally experiences increased consumption, but there
are two offsetting effects on the consumption of the other good: it is now relatively
more expensive but the consumer effectively has higher income.
The actions of firms in our model are analogous to that of a consumer in consumer
choice theory. The direct effect of an increase in the precision of one signal is a shift
toward using that signal at the expense of the other one. This can be seen from
equations 3.8 and 3.9 where σ2y−1 is fixed. This is our “substitution” effect. We know
from chapter 2, however, that the long run effects of such a change are that the economy
converges to a higher level of steady state income variance (or in this chapter, variance
in log income), endogenously increasing the precision of both signals, and increasing
the firms’ use of both. This is our “income” effect. The net result is that the signal for
which precision exogenously increased should unambiguously be used more by the firm
in their payment rule, but the other signal may experience increased or decreased use.
β1 and β2 both play important roles in the investment decision of parents. First
consider equation 3.6. This illustrates the “direct” role of β2. If the firm uses the talent
signal more, there is an improved channel through which to influence the income of your
child. A parent takes advantage of that channel through investment. There is a further
effect of future values of β1 and β2 through A, the marginal value of log income. A is
increasing in the use of the signals. An additional pound of income is more valuable, if
it cannot only be consumed but invested effectively in future generations to raise their
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utility. The more effective is this second channel, through greater discrimination by
firms in the future, allowing them to identify the effects of increased investment, the
more that channel will be used.
To see how this plays out in the model let us take an example. Suppose that there
is a exogenous improvement in the precision of signal one. This must increase the use
of the parental income signal in the firms’ payment rule but, at least at the time of the
change, the talent signal will be used less. A parent may change their investment choice
as a result of a number of forces which come into play. Most directly, as the talent
signal is used less by firms, a parent’s ability to influence their child’s income is reduced,
reducing their incentive to invest. This also reduces the opportunity to improve the
prospects of their grandchildren through increasing the funds available for investment of
their parents. On the other hand, since firms are using the parental income signal more,
there is an incentive to attempt to raise the income of your child since the advantages
of a privileged background for your grandchildren, great-grandchildren and so on, are
improved. This in turn could alter the degree and nature of future discrimination. Any
change in the investment choice thus weighs up the reduced effectiveness of investment
in generating talent and income in subsequent generations with the increased ability to
pass on advantages through birth if such advantages can be established. It is not clear
which of these effects will dominate.
3.3 Steady states of the economy
As in chapter 2, I will be primarily interested in how the economy is influenced by
exogenous changes in meritocracy and advantage. I will examine this issue again within
the new framework of chapter 3. In order to do so, I will deal with three separate cases
of the economy. In the first, there will be “weak” inheritance, by which I mean that
αx + αy < 1. The technology of talent development is such that parent’s income
and investments play a relatively limited role and so who your parents are should be
relatively less important. As in chapter 2, there will no multiplicity of steady states
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in this instance. In the second case, inheritance takes on larger values (αx + αy ≥ 1).
This may lead to a multiplicity of steady states, and we will consider first the steady
state where the firms give relatively little weight to the two signals. Our third case will
examine when firm’s give relatively more weight to the two signals. As in chapter 2,
when inheritance is sufficiently large this will be the only steady state.
3.3.1 Case 1: The steady state of a weak inheritance economy
As mentioned above, a weak inheritance economy will be defined as one for which
αx + αy < 1. We will first focus on two things: the steady state mean log income
level; and the steady state value of the variance in log income. These in turn will allow
us to calculate the steady state mean income, variance in income, correlation between
parents’ and children’s income, and expected value or utility.
We will begin with the variance in the log of income. In order to find the steady
state value, we begin with the income process described in equation 3.10. The variance
of this equation provides a relationship between the variance in log income of adjacent
generations, and the condition σ2y = σ
2
y−1 allows this to be solved for the steady state


















2 are the steady state solutions to equations 3.8 and 3.9. It should be
noted that finding a steady state of this model requires a solution to the same three
equations in three unknowns as finding a steady state to the model of chapter 2, but
with the parameter α replaced with αx + αy.
3 The results of chapter 2 hold for the
variance of the log of income and the correlation of the log of income across generations
3Were β∗1 + (αx + αy)β
∗
2 to be greater than or equal to one β
∗
1 + (αx + αy)β
∗
2 would equal αx+αy.
A necessary condition for this is αx+αy ≥ 1 and so we can be sure that our weak inheritance economy





The steady state value of the mean of log income is found by taking expectations
of the log income equation (3.10) and then finding the value µ∗y for which µy = µy−1 .
µ∗y =
1














Equations 3.13 and 3.14 give us the steady state variance and mean of the log of
income. We are not primarily interested in these values. They do however allow us
to calculate the mean and variance in income. From the definition of the mean of a
log-normally distributed variable, we can find the steady state mean level of income.






The mean of income is increasing in both the mean and variance of log income. For
αx + αy less than one, both of these have a constant finite steady state value and so
steady state mean income has a constant finite value. Steady state mean investment is
given by λ∗E [y]∗ which is the expected value of equation 3.12.
We can use the mean and variance of log income is a similar way to find the variance
of income. Again, appealing to the fact that income is a log-normally distributed
variable we find,













It is also increasing in both the mean and variance of log income and, for αx + αy
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less than one, will have a constant finite value.
In order to find the steady state value of the correlation of income across generations
we need to know not just the mean and variance of log income, but the covariance of
the log of a parent’s and child’s income. We can see from equation 3.10 that this is





















Finally, we are interested in the mean level of utility or value in the economy in
steady state. This is the utility that an individual could expect to receive from behind
the veil of ignorance.
E [V (y)]∗ = A∗µ∗y +B
∗ (3.18)
Prior to knowing who their parents will be, an individual’s expected utility will be
increasing in mean log income, A∗ and B∗. Both A∗ and B∗ are endogenous and given
by equations A.2 and A.4 in Appendix A.
Equations 3.15 through 3.18 define the summary statistics of our steady state econ-
omy when αx + αy < 1. Section 3.2 provides some intuition for how the steady state
values of β1 and β2 will change for an exogenous change in advantage or meritocracy,
but we will again leave it to a numerical exercise to investigate these issues further. We
will be particularly interested to see if there are cases when mean income increases but
expected utility decreases. This could be possible if an exogenous shock caused income
variance to increase and hence the risk which a risk averse agent would face from behind
the veil of ignorance would be greater. It is possible that given the choice of being born
into a country with relatively high or low mean income, an individual may favour the
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poorer country because income variance, and hence risk, would be reduced.
3.3.2 Case 2: The low steady state in a strong inheritance economy
If αx + αy ≥ 1 there are two possible steady states which could emerge. In the “low”
steady state, β1 + (αx + αy)β2 < 1. In this case the mean of log income will grow over
time while the variance of log income will tend towards a constant finite value.
Let us begin with the variance. From equation 3.10 we can see that the variance in
log income is given by,
σ2y = (β1 + (αx + αy)β2)









Since β1 + (αx + αy)β2 < 1 this will tend towards the steady state value given by
equation 3.13. In steady state, it will have a constant finite value. We will see, however,
that this is not the case for the mean of log income.
The mean of log talent can be found by taking expectations of equation 3.1. Mean
log income is then found by taking expectations of the income process in equation 3.10.
Doing so, it is immediately apparent that αx + αy plays a key role.
µy = φ+ αxln
αxβ2
1 + δ − (β1 + αyβ2)






With αx + αy > 1, the value of µy will grow forever. There is steady state growth
which will tend towards a constant rate of αx + αy − 1. Although the variance in log
income does reach a constant finite value, and so log income still has a non-degenerate
distribution, we can see from equations 3.15 and 3.16 how an ever increasing value of
µy will affect the mean and variance of income in steady state. As both are increasing
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functions of mean log income, they too will increase over time.
In order to examine the effects of an exogenous change in meritocracy or advantage
in an environment where the income distribution is changing we will follow a slightly
different method to that of case 1. Instead of examining the effects of a shock on
our steady state, we will examine the effects of a shock given the current state of our
economy. The state variables for case 2 will be µy−1 and σ
2
y−1 and these will become
additional parameters of our numerical exercise.
One interesting aspect of this change in method is that, since σ2y−1 is fixed, we will
be looking purely at the “substitution effect” of a change in meritocracy or advantage.
As one signal is used more, the other will be used less. The effects of an exogenous shock
to meritocracy and advantage will be examined for the generation in which the shock
occurs. Our economy will be summarised by the same statistics as in case 1: mean
income; income variance; the intergenerational correlation of incomes; and expected
utility. Other than the fact that we are no longer examining steady state values, the
equations for these will be the same as in section 3.3.1 for all but the intergenerational











where σ2y is given in equation 3.19. Mean investment will be given by λE [y] which is
the expected value of equation 3.11.
3.3.3 Case 3: The high steady state in a strong inheritance economy
If both αx + αy ≥ 1 and β1 + (αx + αy)β2 ≥ 1, it is clear from equations 3.19 and
3.20 that both the variance and mean of log income will be increasing over time. It is
equally evident from equations 3.15 and 3.16 that this will mean that the steady state
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Parameter Values the parameter may take
αy 0.05, 0.15, ..., 0.75
αx 0.05, 0.15, ..., 0.75
σ2εs1 2, 4, ..., 18
σ2εs2 2, 4, ..., 18
σ2ετ 1, 2, ..., 7
φ 5
δ 0.5
Table 3.1: Parameter values for the numerical exercise in the weak inheritance economy
mean and variance of income will also be increasing. This being the case, the same
approach will be followed as in section 3.3.2. For different values of the state variables,
a numerical exercise will examine the effects of an exogenous shock to advantage or
meritocracy on our economy at the time of the change.
3.4 The weak inheritance economy
As noted in the previous section, when αx + αy < 1 the mean and variance of the log
of income tend towards constant finite values in the long run. This in turn implies
constant finite steady state values of all the key statistics which summarise the state
of our economy. In what follows, we will examine how shocks to meritocracy and
advantage translate into changes in these steady state values. Meritocracy is defined,
as in chapter 2, as the precision in the talent signal, while advantage is the precision
in the parental income signal. The numerical exercise below considers how marginal
increases in both affect the steady state economy given certain values of the parameters.
The parameters for this numerical exercise are given in table 3.1. There are 24,381
combinations of the parameters for which αx + αy < 1.
The parameters φ and δ have been fixed since their role in the determination of
investment and mean income is known. They do not affect β1 and β2 and so an increase
in δ, the discount rate, can be seen from equation 3.11 to decrease investment and from
equations 3.14 and 3.15 to lead to a decrease in mean income. When parents are
investing less in developing talent, the mean income of the economy falls. In addition,
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Statistic Number of cases in which it increased Percentage
E [y]∗ 14,515 59.5
V ar [y]∗ 24,381 100.0
ρ∗y,y−1 13,058 53.6
E [V (y)]∗ 8,209 33.7
E [x]∗ 21,199 86.6
λ∗ 24,381 100.0
Table 3.2: The number and proportion of cases where the steady state values increased
with an exogenous increase in meritocracy in the weak inheritance economy. Total
number of cases = 24,381
since steady state A,B and mean income are all decreasing in δ, it must decrease
expected value. φ has no effect on investment but, since it is the constant term in the
talent process, increases mean income.
3.4.1 The effects of an improvement in meritocracy in a weak inher-
itance economy
For this numerical exercise, the steady state was found for each of our 24,381 parameter
combinations, then the value of σ2εs2 was lowered by 0.001, simulating an exogenous
marginal improvement in the precision of the talent signal. The proportion of cases for
which our key statistics increased is given in table 3.2.
There are some interesting findings in the table. Improvements in the information
on talent do not universally lead to increases in mean income, and only lead to expected
utility improvements in around one-third of cases. In the majority of cases, prior to
discovering who their parents are, people would choose to be born in the economy with
less precise information. Improvements in meritocracy also do not necessarily lead to
increased investment. The rest of this section will discuss some of these findings.
The fall in mean income
The fall in mean income may seem surprising because we know that an improvement
in meritocracy will cause the firm to place greater weight on the talent signal. This
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tends to increase the share of income that parents invest, which has a positive effect on
average income and average talent. What is more, in over half the cases where mean
income is falling, firms’ use of the parental income signal is increased in steady state,
providing further incentive to invest since improvements in children’s income will more
easily be passed on to subsequent generations.
The circumstances under which these do not lead to an increase in mean income
can be seen in equation 3.14. When αx is small, the effect of investment on mean log
income is weakened. When investment does not translate into increased talent, there
is no way for parents to increase the income or expected utility of their children and so
they do not invest, even if β2 is high. The driving force of falls in mean income tends
to be the last term in equation 3.14. This comes from the variance in the distribution
of log talent, conditional on the signals. Additional information provided by the talent
signal causes this to fall, and all the more so for large values of β2.
An example of an economy likely to exhibit falling steady state mean income would
be one with a high value of σ2ετ but a low value of αx. The high value of σ
2
ετ leads to
a large amount of variance in talent, and a high value of β2. However, the low value of
αx means that parents do not invest to any great extent, despite the high value of β2,
and do not respond to increases in β2 with increased investment. This is an economy
characterised by low investment, talent distributed to a large extent by luck, and firms
using the talent signal a great deal.4
It is also the case that mean income may be falling despite increases in mean
investment. This happens in close to 6,700 cases. It must be the case in these situations
that the share of income being invested in children is increasing but it is not translating
to any great extent into improvements in income. Since parents know that this will
happen, it is likely that the increases in investment are small. The conditions for which
this occurs are the same as for a fall in income in general. A small value of αx prevents
the increased investment share from impacting on income while a large β2, induced by
4To provide some evidence of this, there are nearly 3,000 cases of falling mean income when σ2ετ is
7 compared to only 19 when it is 1, and over 3,000 cases when αx is 0.05 compared to 217 when it is
0.75.
85
a large exogenous variance in talent, causes the falling σ2εs2 to pull down mean income.
A fall in mean investment itself may seem odd when faced with an environment
where talent is more easily displayed. This fall in investment is always associated with
a fall in mean income, and so it is the fact that mean income can be lower in more
meritocratic societies which may push down mean investment. In fact it could be a
concern with the model that the constant coefficient of relative risk aversion of one is
driving the slight ambiguity over the direction of change in mean investment. It is well
known that in a standard intertemporal consumption and savings problem the income
and substitution effects cancel out for the log utility function. Agents save neither more
nor less in response to a change in the interest rate. This is not what is happening
here in response to the change in the level of discrimination. In every case λ∗ increases.
Parents unambiguously invest a larger fraction of their income in steady state in more
meritocratic societies. Falls in steady state mean investment are always driven by falls
in mean income and not by agents investing a smaller fraction of their income.
The fall in expected value
The fact that individuals may choose to live in a country where their talent is more
difficult to display may also seem somewhat surprising. This is especially so since
in over 6,000 cases where expected value is falling, mean income is increasing. From
behind the veil of ignorance, people would be happier choosing to be born prior to the
improvement in meritocracy into the poorer economy. Why this might occur has to do
with the increasing variance in income. The value function displays decreasing marginal
utility from income and hence risk or inequality aversion. The increase in mean income
has to offset the increased variance in income for an individual to be better off.
The reasons why this might not occur again boil down to the parameter values
which tend to accompany it. Once more, the inheritance parameters are relatively low
and the exogenous variance in talent high. If these conditions do not cause mean income
to fall, they are likely to cause mean income gains to be small. That, coupled with
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the difficulty in passing those gains onto children and grandchildren, will make them
relatively less valuable and more likely to be overshadowed by the increased variance.
The fall in the intergenerational correlation of income
The fall in the correlation on incomes is a new feature to this chapter. The correlation
of the log of income and the log of parental income is increasing, as in chapter 2, but
this does not necessarily translate into an increase in the correlation of income and
parental income. It is given by equation 3.17. Since a fall in σ2εs2 will inevitably lead
to the firm using the talent signal more, one simple way to nullify the effect of this on
the correlation is to have little or no inheritance (a small value of αx + αy).
There is a common theme that has emerged over the course of this section: occasions
where mean income falls while information is more readily available or investment
increasing, expected value falls in the face of increasing income, or mobility increases
despite increased use of the talent signal, all feature low inheritance (particularly αx)
and high exogenous variance in talent. In some respects these could be thought of
as healthy economies. The lack of inheritance will tend to push up intergenerational
mobility, and the negative effect which it has on investment will be offset by the high
variance in talent propping up β2. In other ways they could be thought off as unhealthy.
The low value of αx implies the technology for turning investment into talent (the
private education system) is inefficient. In any case, and for various reasons outlined
above, these economies display some interesting features.
An interesting case is illustrated in figure 3.1. Here αx and αy are 0.35 and σ
2
ετ is 2.5.
Higher value of the exogenous variance in talent, and lower values of the inheritance
parameters, will tend to cause mean income to be falling across the whole range of
meritocracy values. We see here that it is only falling at high values of meritocracy,
which coincide with higher values of β2. This illustrates the role of β2 in pulling down
mean income as meritocracy increases. The implications of the previous discussion were
that, if σ2ετ was not large enough, nor inheritance small enough, to cause mean income
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Figure 3.1: The effects of increasing meritocracy on mean income, income variance,
the intergenerational correlation of incomes and expected value: αx = 0.35; αy = 0.35;
σ2εs1 = 20; and σ
2
ετ = 2.5
to be falling as meritocracy increases, they could still pull down expected value. This
is exactly what happens when meritocracy is increasing from a low value.
3.4.2 The effects of an increase in inherited advantages in a weak
inheritance economy
The results of the numerical example investigating the effects of a fall in σ2εs1 of 0.001
are shown in table 3.3. In all cases firms use the parental income signal more, but
the talent signal less. Intuitively the share of income invested by parents could go up
or down. However, the intergenerational correlation of incomes always increases. We
saw in the previous section that increased precision in the talent signal, which tends to
be correlated with parental income, was not always enough to induce falls in mobility.
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Statistic Number of cases in which it increased Percentage
E [y]∗ 16,338 67.0
V ar [y]∗ 24,076 98.7
ρ∗y,y−1 24,381 100.0
E [V (y)]∗ 8,890 36.5
E [x]∗ 20,616 84.6
λ∗ 23,701 97.2
Table 3.3: The number and proportion of cases where the steady state values increased
with an exogenous increase in inherited advantages in the weak inheritance economy.
Total number of cases = 24,381
Improved information about background is, on every occasion, for this parameter set.
The fall in mean income and variance
We know from equations 3.15 and 3.16 that the steady state mean and variance of
income are both determined by the steady state mean and variance of the log of income.
From chapter 2 we know that the variance in the log of income will be increasing. A
fall in the mean or variance in income then requires a fall in the mean of log income.
If the share of income being invested is increasing, a small value of αx will nullify
that, while a large fall in β2 would push down the last term in equation 3.14. At least
for the parameter values we are investigating, a large fall in β2 is induced by a large
value of β2. There are at least two reasons why firms may respond a great deal to the
talent signal. A large amount of exogenous variance in talent would create an incentive
for firms to use it. Also, a high precision would make it more informative, although as
a counter to this a small value of σ2εs2 will tend to nullify the effects of the fall in β2.
A small value of σ2εs2 does lead to falls in the mean and variance of income, although a
large amount of exogenous variance in talent may have an even stronger effect.5
As in the previous section, a small value of αx and large amount of exogenous
variance in talent are the conditions under which a fall in mean income can occur in
5The mean and variance of income fall in 18 and zero cases respectively when σ2ετ is 1 but in 2,410
and 94 cases when it is 7. The mean and variance fall in 1,594 and 259 cases respectively when σ2εs2 is
2, but only 419 and zero when it is 18 (in fact for any value of σ2εs2 greater than 6 we find that variance
is always increasing).
89
the face of increasing mean investment. The effect of an increased share of income being
invested in children is reduced by an inability to turn that into talent. The lack of a
strong investment effect will make it more likely that the fall in β2 which accompanies
an increase in advantage will pull down mean income.
Also as in the previous section, we can consider whether the fact that mean invest-
ment can rise or fall is driven by perfectly offsetting effects on the investment choice due
to the coefficient of relative risk aversion being equal to one. In over ninety-seven per
cent of cases λ increases, so again there does not seem to be a lot of ambiguity in the
parent’s investment choice: they nearly always invest a larger fraction of their income
when information is more readily available to firms and the advantages which invest-
ment creates can be passed on to children and grandchildren to a greater extent. In all
of the cases where the fraction invested falls, β2 falls, as it must since β1 is increasing.
A relatively large fall in β2 will provide an incentive to invest less in children which, as
mentioned above, seems to occur at large values of β2. We would therefore expect a
shock to advantage to produce a large negative effect on the incentive to invest when
σ2ετ is large and that this would be the circumstances under which λ
∗ may fall. This is
what I find. This story seems to be consistent with agents responding to changes in the
incentive to invest rather than the incentive to invest experiencing perfectly offsetting
positive and negative effects.
The fall in expected value
There are just under 7,500 cases where expected value falls while mean income is
increasing. The conditions for this are the same as in the case of an increase in meri-
tocracy. An example where αx and αy are 0.05, and σ
2
ετ 7, is illustrated in figure 3.2.
Although the additional information may raise your expected income, it will also raise
the uncertainty you face over that income (if mean income is increasing, the variance
in income is also increasing). The increase in mean income has to make you sufficiently
happier to overcome the increased risk of low income.
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Figure 3.2: The effects of increasing advantage on mean income, income variance, the
intergenerational correlation of incomes and expected value: αx = 0.05; αy = 0.05;
σ2εs1 = 12; and σ
2
ετ = 7
3.4.3 A discussion of the weak inheritance economy
Some of the more interesting results derived in this section have had at their heart a
great deal of similarity in the parameters which bring them about. One of the key
things is a lack of inheritability, particularly a low value of αx. This implies that
private investments made in children do not pay off. The private education system
is inefficient. Even when mean investment increases it may not lead to increases in
expected income since that investment is ineffective and, even when it does raise mean
income, it may not improve the utility which an individual expects to receive since those
income gains cannot easily be passed on to the next generation and the improvements
in the information available to firms create greater uncertainty. Large values of σ2ετ also
feed into this. Therefore, in an economy where people display a wide range of talents,
but it is difficult to influence the talent of your child and hence pass on advantages,
91
Parameter Values the parameter may take
αy 0.3, 0.4, ..., 0.7
αx 0.3, 0.4, ..., 0.7
σ2εs1 2, 6, ..., 18
σ2εs2 2, 6, ..., 18
σ2ετ 1, 3, ..., 7
µy−1 2, 4, ..., 10
σ2y−1 2, 4, ..., 10
φ 5
δ 0.5
Table 3.4: Parameter values for the numerical exercise in the strong inheritance econ-
omy
you may prefer a lower mean income if increases in that mean income reflect increases
in meritocracy and advantage that bring about greater income variance.
3.5 The strong inheritance economy
The numerical exercise which I will undertake for the strong inheritance economy (αx+
αy > 1) is slightly different to what we examined in the weak economy case. This is
because, although it may converge to a constant finite value of the variance in log
income, the economy will not converge to a steady state finite value of the mean and
variance in income. Both will experience growth. What we will do instead of examining
the steady states is to look at the shift in the level of our key variables when there is an
exogenous shock to meritocracy and advantage, given the current state of the economy.
It is the shift at the time of the change for that generation. For this we need two more
parameters which are our state variables: µy−1 , the mean of the log of parental income;
and σ2y−1 the variance of the log of parental income. The parameters used are given
in table 3.4. There are 37,500 combinations of these parameters for which αx + αy
is greater than one. In this case λ is omitted from the numerical analysis since, as
E [x] = λE [y−1] and E [y−1] is given, λ must move in the same direction as E [x].
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Statistic Number of cases in which it increased Percentage
E [y] 7,500 20.0
V ar [y] 7,500 20.0
ρy,y−1 19,995 53.3
E [V (y)] 26,985 72.0
E [x] 7,500 20.0
Table 3.5: The number and proportion of cases where the values increased with an
exogenous increase in meritocracy in the strong inheritance economy. Total number of
cases = 37,500
3.5.1 The effects of an improvement in meritocracy in a strong inher-
itance economy
The results of an exogenous increase in meritocracy are shown in table 3.5. In all cases
β2 must increase and β1 must fall.
The fall in mean investment
There are only 7,500 cases where, faced with a higher value of β2 and a lower value of
β1, parents invest more in their children. When this occurs, it also leads to increases in
mean income and income variance. It only occurs when σ2εs2 is equal to 2, its minimum
value, at which point β2 will be large and β1 small. That is to say, only if the primary
channel through which parents provide advantages to their children is investment, does
investment increase with an improvement in meritocracy.
Looking more closely at λ we can see that it is increasing in β2 and A. We know
that β2 is increasing, so for mean investment to decrease, A must fall. Therefore A falls
in at least 30,000 cases. This says that improvements in meritocracy tend to reduce the
marginal value of log income. Improvements in meritocracy push the economy towards
providing advantages through investment (at the expense of parental consumption)
and away from providing natural advantages through environmental influences without
such a sacrifice. What this tells us is that an additional unit of income will be more
valuable in a society where you can provide advantages to your children without the
sacrifice of your own consumption than in one which requires investment.
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The fall in the intergenerational correlation of income
The fall in the intergenerational correlation of incomes was always more likely to occur
in this exercise than that performed on the steady states in the previous section. This
is because, in the steady state case, the substitution effect which causes a shift towards
the talent signal was accompanied by a feedback effect whereby increased variance of
the log of income caused both signals to be used more. This feedback effect was likened
to the income effect from a fall in an equilibrium price. As it pushes up the use of
both signals by the firm, it decreases mobility. In the current case, where we examine
the effect in one generation, it is not present. There is therefore less reason to believe
mobility should necessarily fall.
The parameter which most strongly affects whether mobility increases or decreases
is σ2ετ . When σ
2
ετ is large it means that there is a lot of exogenous variance in talent
which can only be identified by use of the talent signal. As a result, β2 will tend to be
large and β1 small. Advantages are primarily provided to children through the talent
signal, and hence by investment in their development. An increase in β2 under these
circumstances further enhances this opportunity for rich parents to provide advantages
to their children and therefore reduces mobility. Another way to thinks about this
is from the firms point of view: if people are exogenously very different, firms place
a high value on information about those differences and being better able to identify
them increases this discrimination and reduces mobility.
The fall in expected value
We have already established that in 30,000 cases E [y] is reduced and that in all those
cases A is reduced. However in close to 27,000 of these cases E [V (y)] is increasing.
It must be that in these cases B has increased. So although the marginal value of
log income is reduced in more meritocratic societies, in the majority of cases people
expect to have higher utility nonetheless. They expect to derive less utility from their
own income but more value generally from living in a more meritocratic society. This
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Statistic Number of cases in which it increased Percentage
E [y] 25,935 69.2
V ar [y] 37,500 100.0
ρy,y−1 37,500 100.0
E [V (y)] 0 0.0
E [x] 16,175 43.1
Table 3.6: The number and proportion of cases where the values increased with an
exogenous increase in advantages in the strong inheritance economy. Total number of
cases = 37,500
is likely to be related to the fall in income variance which the shocks to meritocracy
are producing. In the vast majority of cases where income variance is increasing,
expected value is decreasing, and in the vast majority of cases where income variance is
decreasing, expected value is increasing. This gives additional weight to the argument
that changes in uncertainty over income are the driving force behind changes in expected
value.
3.5.2 The effects of an increase in inherited advantages in a strong
inheritance economy
The result of a fall in inherited advantages is shown in table 3.6.
The increase in variance and fall in mobility
One of the most striking results from this exercise was that variance increased and
mobility fell in all cases. Despite the fall in β2 which inevitably follows an increase in
inherited advantages, the increase in discrimination by background was always suffi-
ciently large to have these effects. In order to investigate this further, another numerical
analysis was carried out where σ2εs1 and σ
2
εs2 could take values {16, 18, ..., 24} and σ
2
ετ
could take values {1,2,3,4}. Again, in all cases variance increased and mobility fell with
an exogenous increase in the extent of inherited advantages.
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The fall in expected value
By running the numerical exercise with the alternative parameter sets for the error
variances, I was able to investigate whether expected value always fell. It did not,
but fell in over 23,000 of the 37,500 cases. From this experiment I was able to reach
two further conclusions. Firstly, in all cases where expected value was falling despite
expected income increasing, variance was increasing. This adds further weight to my
argument that uncertainly over income drives falls in expected utility.
Secondly, there were 4,320 cases where people had higher expected utility after
the shock to advantages, yet expected to have lower incomes and experience more
uncertainty over their income. This relates to the fact that inherited advantages can
be passed on to your descendants without any reduction in your own consumption,
making them particularly valuable. In some cases this can lead people to prefer a
world in which their income will be lower on average, and more uncertain, but create
greater natural advantages for their children.
The increase in mean investment
This also relates to investment decisions. A fall in σ2εs1 inevitably leads to a fall in β2 and
so in the more than 16,000 cases where investment in increasing it must be that A has
increased. The marginal value of log income may be larger when that income provides
natural advantages to your children to a greater extent, rather than advantages through
investment. Furthermore, although the advantages which you provide to your children
are limited by your own income, you can create advantages for your grandchildren,
great grandchildren, and so on, by investing in the talent development of their parents.
This is what is occurring in the more than 16,000 cases where mean investment has
increased in spite of a reduction in the extent to which firms discriminate on talent.
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3.6 Conclusions
There were two main parts to this chapter. The first was to provide a forward-looking
component to the model of chapter 2, and consider the equilibrium investment rule of
parents. This brings the model much more closely in line with the existing statistical
discrimination literature, although the multiplicity of equilibria present in those models
does not feature here. In this model there is a unique equilibrium investment rule, but
the multiplicity of steady states founds in chapter 2 remains. The results found in that
chapter translate directly into increases in the variance of log income, and correlation
of the logs on income and parental income, as meritocracy and advantage increase.
We are not primarily interested in the mean, variance or correlations of the log of
income. Our main concern is with the distribution of income itself. The second part of
this chapter looked at how the mean and variance of income changed with exogenous
shocks to meritocracy and advantage within this new framework. It also considered
mobility and expected utility.
In many cases, though not all, we found that variance and mobility still moved
in opposite directions. This was particularly true for exogenous increases in inherited
advantages. There were also a number of interesting results relating to a particular
subset of the parameters. These were when inheritance was weak (particularly αx,
such as in the case where the private education system is inefficient) and there was
a large amount of exogenous variance in talent. In this case, mean investment might
fall despite talent being more easily recognised, mean income may fall despite mean
investment increasing, and expected value might decrease despite expected income
going up. It is the last of these that is probably the most interesting. Meritocracy and
inherited advantages both increase variance and hence, prior to birth, create greater
uncertainty over the income you will receive. A risk averse person might prefer to
be born into an economy where they expect to be poorer but avoid this increased
uncertainty, and so despite raising incomes, meritocracy and inherited advantages may
make agents, on average, more unhappy.
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Appendix A
The parameters of the value
function
In section 3.1.3 I calculated the parameters of the value function of the parent. These
were functions of the parent’s expected parameters of the value function of their child.
In this appendix I will calculate explicitly the values of A−1 and B−1.
Let us begin with A−1.
A−1 = 1 +
1
1 + δ
E−1 [A] [β1 + (αx + αy)β2]
This is the same as in the body of the text but with a subscript placed on the
expectations operator to make clear that it is the expectation of the parent.
Moving forward one period,
A = 1 +
1
1 + δ
E [A+1] [β1,+1 + (αx + αy)β2,+1]
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where β1,+1 and β2,+1 are the weights assigned to the signals by firms in the grandchild’s
generation. Since the β terms follow a deterministic path, everything on the right-hand
side is known to the parent. Therefore, E−1 [A] = A and so,
A−1 = 1 +
β1 + (αx + αy)β2
1 + δ
+ E [A+1]
β1 + (αx + αy)β2
1 + δ
β1,+1 + (αx + αy)β2,+1
1 + δ
Since each parent has one child in each generation, families are infinitely lived. As
in the main body of the chapter, we will assume that β∗1 + (αx + αy)β
∗
2 < 1 + δ where
the *’s indicate steady state values. The implications of this constraint are explained
briefly in section 3.1.3. It ensures that the sequence below converges to a positive finite
value for A−1. If we continue this process through the generations of a family we can
see that,
A−1 = 1+
β1 + (αx + αy)β2
1 + δ
+
β1 + (αx + αy)β2
1 + δ
β1,+1 + (αx + αy)β2,+1
1 + δ
+
β1 + (αx + αy)β2
1 + δ
β1,+1 + (αx + αy)β2,+1
1 + δ
β1,+2 + (αx + αy)β2,+2
1 + δ
+ . . .
Each additional term will be smaller than the previous, at least once a steady state
value of β1 and β2 are reached, which ensures convergence.
By the same logic,
A =E−1 [A] = 1 +
β1,+1 + (αx + αy)β2,+1
1 + δ
+
β1,+1 + (αx + αy)β2,+1
1 + δ
β1,+2 + (αx + αy)β2,+2
1 + δ
+
β1,+1 + (αx + αy)β2,+1
1 + δ
β1,+2 + (αx + αy)β2,+2
1 + δ
β1,+3 + (αx + αy)β2,+3
1 + δ
+ . . .
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which can be written,




j=1 [β1,+j + (αx + αy)β2,+j ]
(1 + δ)i
(A.1)
This is the value of A which is used in the parent’s investment function in equation
3.11. The additional utility which a child will receive from an increase in his income
depends on the extent to which he can use that income, through investment, to influence
the incomes and utilities of future generations. This in turn depends on the level of
discrimination which those future generations will face.1
It is straightforward to show that when β1 = β1,+1 = ... = β
∗
1 and β2 = β2,+1 =











1 + δ − [β∗1 + (αx + αy)β∗2 ]
(A.2)
which is the steady state value of A used in section 3.3.1. The assumption β∗1 +
(αx + αy)β
∗
2 < 1 + δ ensures that in steady state an individual’s income has a positive
effect on his income.
Moving on to consider B−1 from section 3.1.3, we know that B−1 is given by,
1A general version of this equation can be written to provide the value of A for any generation in
the future. This is given by,





































= χ (A, β1, β2) +
E−1 [B]
1 + δ
This is the same equation as was given in section 3.1.3 but having substituted for λ.








χ (A+i, β1,+i, β2,+i, µy,+i−1) = ln
[
1 + δ





















− [β1,+i − (1− β2,+1) (αy + αx)]µy,+i−1
}













2For small values of λ+i, the proportion of income invested by parents in i generations time, this
gives,
χ (A+i, β1,+i, β2,+i, µy,+i−1) ≈
− αxA+i [1 + β2,+i]














This thesis has considered how information about an individual’s talent or background
is used by firms, and how that process is affected by the endogenous determination of
the quality of that information. Each chapter attempted to build on the previous one,
to look in more detail at some of the features of the economy which emerges as a result
of this dynamic process. In the first chapter, talent was a binary variable. The firm
had no information about whether a potential employee was talented, but had perfect
information about their parental income which defined an individual’s “class”. This
seemed a natural set-up from which to investigate class and the allocation of workers
to tasks, but less-so for an investigation of the inequality and mobility which emerge
in response to the extent of discrimination which firms carry out. For one thing, there
was no mobility in chapter one. Therefore, in chapter two the analysis switched to
a model where talent and income were both continuous and jointly determined. In
general, neither was perfectly known by firms though they received a noisy signal on
each. Discrimination fed inequality, while inequality fed discrimination. Additional
realism was then added in chapter three: the income process was log-normal, which
more closely matches the observed income distribution than the normal one used in
chapter two; risk-averse optimising agents chose how much to invest in their children;
and there was potential growth in mean income. The inclusion of optimising agents
also allowed some welfare analysis to be brought in. This final section of the thesis
will summarise and discuss some of the main conclusions which each of these set-ups
allowed me to reach.
The first chapter of this thesis looks at the class divisions which emerge in society.
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In the absence of classes, firms lack the information they require to determine the talent
of an individual. They have little to base their pay decisions on and do not know which
workers to assign to a relatively complex task. The class signal provides them, perhaps
imperfectly, with that information. The cost is that the talented group of people created
is smaller than the proportion of workers they would like to assign to the complex task.
Within the model, where the informational gains exist, they dominate the allocation
costs. There are class divisions of society which can be sustained in steady state for
which both classes of society are better off than if no such class division existed, and
in which output is higher. Instead of everyone having the same probability of being
talented, society specialises – the upper class specialise in the complex task and achieve
a high marginal productivity. The spillover to the lower classes also raises their marginal
productivity.
The ability of firms to offer wages based on class causes those classes of workers
to sort appropriately into jobs and raises the economy’s output. However, there are
many steady state divisions of society which go beyond the point at which these gains
are exhausted. The upper class can be squeezed in order to raise their level of talent,
and society’s productivity, only to the point where they are all talented. Equally, these
potential gains should not mask the discrimination which is going on. Even in the
absence of any legal impediments to them taking the complex job, the informational
asymmetry between them and the firm causes a talented lower class worker to be de
facto denied access to the high paying jobs offered to the upper classes, despite the fact
that he is able to perform the task while some members of the upper class may not be
able to. Class is still very much an imperfect sorting mechanism for firms.
The second and third chapters can be viewed as separate within the same general
framework. In the second chapter, means are normalised to be zero and I focus on the
variance in income and its correlation across generations. The early part of that chap-
ter is concerned with the feedback effect whereby discrimination is both caused by, and
a cause of, greater inequality. The latter part of the chapter considers some perverse
effects from improvements in meritocracy: the talented workers identified in merito-
cratic societies tend to be from rich backgrounds; and since meritocratic institutions
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facilitate discrimination amongst workers, they may lead firms to use information of
a worker’s background more. Both of these feed into lower intergenerational mobility,
and this provides a new explanation of the “Great Gatsby Curve” based on incomplete
information.
There was one policy discussed in this chapter. It was noted that a policy which
breaks the close link between parental income and human capital development would
both lower inequality and raise mobility. One way to break this link would seem to
be early childhood interventions. There have been arguments put forward previously
for how early childhood interventions would effect the economy. Heckman and various
coauthors have argued, based on work in neuroscience and childhood development, that
early childhood interventions would reduce inequality because of the complementarity
between skills produced at different stages of childhood (see for example Cunha &
Heckman (2007) and Heckman & Masterov (2007)). This chapter puts forward another
explanation for why this might occur based on information extraction by firms and the
role of early childhood interventions in limiting the usefulness of information on family
background.
The final chapter of the thesis considers in more detail the investment decision
underlying the relationship between parental income and a child’s human capital de-
velopment. In the model of that chapter there is a unique equilibrium investment rule
whereby parents invest a constant fraction of their income in their child. That fraction
is increasing in inheritance (exogenously governed by the elasticities of child’s talent
with respect to parental income and investment) and the endogenous extent to which
firms discriminate. There are two spin-offs of this process which are important inno-
vations in this chapter. The first is that mean income is generally not equal to zero
and there may be steady state growth in mean income. The second is that, because we
have optimising agents, welfare can be considered and agents are risk-averse in income.
The main result to emphasise from the second part of this chapter was that expected
utility might be higher in less meritocratic societies. The increased ability of firms to
tell workers apart leads to greater labour market discrimination and inequality. Given
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agents are risk averse, they will be relatively unhappy with this income inequality and
the uncertainty which meritocracy encourages. In fact, even when meritocracy raises
mean income it might lower expected utility because of the inequality which it creates.
There has been one theme which has been carried throughout this thesis – there
can be informational gains from discrimination based on background. In chapter 1 this
raised productivity through improved sorting and spillover effects, while in chapter 3 it
tended to do the same through encouraging investment. However, in chapters 2 and 3
it was the basis for the feedback effect which exaggerated increases in income inequality
and the intergenerational correlation of incomes. It is not obvious therefore that these
informational gains are beneficial to welfare. The existence of rich and poor classes
of workers creates advantages and disadvantages which go beyond their talents. We
may need to be careful about how we consider meritocracy, at least as defined by the
ability of workers to display their talent and be paid accordingly. Meritocracy leads to
discrimination and, with it, inequality and a lack of mobility. If it leads firms to identify
and promote the children of the rich, the persistent inequality which this generates may
not be viewed in a positive light by a society of risk averse agents. The value to a worker
of a privileged background may be great while at the same time the value to society
of a privileged class of workers is limited at best. Classes and background allow us to
discriminate, they allow us to identify the talented in society, they may even encourage
investment in talent and raise mean income, but, when it comes to society’s welfare, the
uncertainty over income which they create may be sufficient to lower expected utility
and cause people to prefer poorer countries in which the income they receive is more
certain and the discrimination they face less severe.
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